The Consequences of Bulk in Our Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of Checks and the Bank\u27s Duty of Ordinary Care under the 1990 Revision to the Uniform Commercial Code When It Honors Forged Checks by Budnitz, Mark E.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-1990
The Consequences of Bulk in Our Banking Diet:
Bulk Filing of Checks and the Bank's Duty of
Ordinary Care under the 1990 Revision to the
Uniform Commercial Code When It Honors
Forged Checks
Mark E. Budnitz
Georgia State University College of Law, mbudnitz@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Accounting Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the
Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark E. Budnitz, The Consequences of Bulk in Our Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of Checks and the Bank's Duty of Ordinary Care under
the 1990 Revision to the Uniform Commercial Code When It Honors Forged Checks, 63 Temp. L. Rev. 729 (1990).
THE CONSEQUENCES OF BULK IN OUR BANKING
DIET: BULK FILING OF CHECKS AND THE BANK'S
DUTY OF ORDINARY CARE UNDER THE 1990
REVISION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WHEN IT HONORS FORGED CHECKS
Mark E. Budnitz*
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 730
I. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SCHEME OF LOSS
ALLOCATION FOR FORGED SIGNATURES: TORT OR CONTRACT? 732
A. The Bank's Strict Liability for Paying Checks with Forged
Signatures ............................................... 732
B. The Contractual Relationship between Customers and Banks . 733
C. The Liability of the Negligent Customer .................... 734
D. Liability Reverts to Bank if it Fails to Exercise Ordinary Care 735
1. Ordinary Care in its "Normal Tort Meaning"........... 735
2. Ordinary Care and the Morals of the Marketplace ....... 737
3. General Banking Usage Contrasted with Usage of Trade. 738
4. Ordinary Care within a Contract Cause of Action ....... 739
E. The Parties' Contract and the Banks' Duty to Verify Signatures 741
II. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF LOSS ALLOCATION ................. 745
A. The Loss Spreading Principle .............................. 745
B. The Loss Reduction Principle .............................. 746
1. Taking Precautions .................................... 746
2. Technological Innovation .............................. 748
3. Responsiveness and Learning .......................... 750
C. The Loss Imposition Principle .............................. 753
III. SIGHT REVIEW V. BLIND BULK PROCESSING: THE CASE LAW .. 756
A. Fact Scenarios - Variability Contributes to a Confusing Body
of L aw .................................................. 756
B. Legal Analysis - Whether to Focus on the Customer or Other
Banks and "Efficiency" ................................... 758
C. The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis .......................... 767
IV. THE NEW, IMPROVED (?) SECTION 4-406 ....................... 774
A. The New Definition of Ordinary Care ...................... 775
B. Sight Review is not Required ............................... 776
C. General Banking Usage Standard Fails to Address the
Fundamental Issue ....................................... 777
Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A., Dartmouth
College, 1966; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1969. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Cindy S. Stacey.
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
D. Proving the Bank's Negligence Substantially Contributed to the
L oss ..................................................... 778
E. The Comparative Negligence Conundrum ................... 780
1. The Pros and Cons of Comparative Negligence .......... 781
2. Revised Code's Approach to Comparative Negligence .... 782
3. Arguments Opposing Comparative Negligence in the
Section 4-406 Context ................................. 782
4. Problems in Applying the Revised Code's Comparative
N egligence ........................................... 783
F. Does the Revised Code Strike the Proper Balance? ........... 787
1. Truncation ........................................... 788
2. Individual Consumers ................................. 790
V. A BETTER APPROACH ......................................... 790
A. Possible Approaches ....................................... 790
B. A Proposal to Improve the Revised Code .................... 792
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 796
INTRODUCTION
Recent changes approved by the sponsors of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC" or "Code") regarding customer liability for forged checks have
made a bank's choice of its check processing procedures an important issue.1
Over the years, banks increasingly have adopted automated methods to handle
check processing, and the UCC revisions, in part, are intended to deal with such
technological innovations. 2 The need for an adjustment to the present Code is
demonstrated by the conceptual and analytical disarray among several recent
1. The text of the revisions is published in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Revised Article 4 -
Bank Deposits and Collections § 4-406 (Proposed Final Draft, Revised May 10, 1990), in SELECTED
COMMERCIAL STATUTES app. VI (1990 ed.) [hereinafter Revision Draft - article 4] (includes Con-
forming and Miscellaneous Amendments to UCC). See infra note 340 for the text of relevant por-
tions of revised § 4-406.
The sponsors of the UCC are the American Law Institute [hereinafter ALl] and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSL]. Rubin, Policies and
Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC, 43 Bus. LAW. 621 (1988). The ALI
approved a final draft of the revision to Articles 3 and 4 of the Code in May, 1990. 58 U.S.L.W.
2688 (May 29, 1990). The NCCUSL gave its approval to the revision in July, 1990. Consumer
Union Seeks More Protection for Consumers in UCC Articles 3 and 4, 55 Bank. Rep. (BNA) 270
(Aug. 13, 1990). For a description of the drafting history of this project, see Rubin, supra. Prior to
the initiation of work on the revisions, the sponsors had attempted to draft a comprehensive pay-
ments code covering all types of fund transfer systems. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the
Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664, 1665 & n.9 (1983).
The term "customer" as used in this article has the same meaning as the term "drawer" given in
the UCC. That is, the drawer is the person who issues a check ordering the bank to pay a third
person by signing the check in the lower right hand corner. D. EPSTEIN, J. MARTIN, W. HENNING
& S. NICKLES, BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 347, 354 (3d ed. 1988).
The term "bank" as used in this article has the same meaning as the definition given in U.C.C.
§ 1-201(4) (1989) (" 'Bank' means any person engaged in the business of banking"). The word
"bank," therefore, includes commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions.
2. Rubin, supra note 1, at 628-29.
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court decisions interpreting the Code's requirement that banks exercise ordinary
care.3 While the need for Code reform is apparent, the modifications proposed
in the revised Code fail to address fundamental issues, create conceptual confu-
sion, and, without justification, upset the balance of rights established under the
present law.
Banks face a daunting task when processing checks. Experts estimate that
each year financial institutions process more than forty billion checks, transfer-
ring approximately thirty trillion dollars.4 Speed is vital due to availability dead-
lines set by state5 and federal law.6 In response, most banks have turned to
technology. In the past, all banks conducted sight review; each check was ex-
amined by a bank employee who compared the signature on the check with that
on the bank's signature card. Skyrocketing labor costs and large increases in
check volume induced many banks to convert to a procedure referred to as bulk
filing.7 Under this system, checks are filed in bulk until the bank prepares its
periodic account statement. At that time, machines automatically sort the unre-
viewed checks into each customer's file. Some banks, including most credit un-
ions, do not conduct sight review of any checks.8 Some banks conduct sight
review of checks over a certain amount, subjecting only the smaller checks to
bulk filing.
Under the present Code, the customer who fails to report a forged signature
promptly is liable for any loss, but can shift the loss to the bank if the customer
can prove the bank failed to exercise ordinary care.9 The revised Code changes
the definition of ordinary care, requires proof that the bank's failure to exercise
3. Compare Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340,
346, 546 N.E.2d 904, 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613-14 (1989) (bank's inspection process failed to meet
standard of ordinary care because procedures provided little chance to detect forged checks) and
McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (standard of
ordinary care not met where credit union failed to establish any signature verification process) with
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988) (bank deter-
mined to have exercised ordinary care even though it did not examine the signature on every check)
and Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783 (1990)
(whether bank exercised ordinary care where it does not verify manually checks under $1000 is a
question of fact).
4. J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, CHECKS, PAYMENTS, AND ELECTRONIC BANKING 227 (1986).
5. U.C.C. § 4-301 (drawee banks must dishonor checks before its midnight deadline). All refer-
ences to the UCC are to the official text unless otherwise stated.
6. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1990) (regulation promulgated pursuant to the Expedited Funds Availa-
bility Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988), requiring banks to make funds accessible to depositors
promptly).
7. A 1988 survey conducted by the Bank Administration Institute found that median produc-
tivity was four times higher under bulk filing. Ledford, Check Fraud Cases Lead Courts to Scrutinize
Bulk Filing, an Automated Processing Method, MAG. OF BANK ADMIN., Aug. 1989, at 8.
8. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
9. U.C.C. § 4-406 (2)-(3). Section 4-406 provides in pertinent part:
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of acount... or otherwise in a reason-
able manner makes the statement... available to the customer, the customer must exercise
reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement.., to discover his unauthorized
signature... and must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed... to comply with the duties imposed
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
ordinary care substantially contributed to the loss resulting from the forgery,
and requires the finder of fact to allocate loss according to the principles of
comparative negligence.' 0
This article examines the present Code scheme, and describes the confusion
caused by the mixing of contract and tort concepts. The article next applies an
economic theory of loss allocation to five recent cases. The revised Code is then
critiqued in terms of this theory and these cases. Under this analysis, it becomes
apparent that the new definition of ordinary care is a significant improvement.
The introduction of comparative negligence as a method of loss allocation, how-
ever, is a step backward. Finally, the article proposes an alternative approach,
which adopts the new definition of ordinary care, but also establishes the banks'
duty to maintain some type of check review procedure that reasonably relates to
the detection of forgeries. This restores the balance that exists under the present
Code.
I. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SCHEME OF LOSS ALLOCATION FOR
FORGED SIGNATURES: TORT OR CONTRACT?
A. The Bank's Strict Liability for Paying Checks with Forged Signatures
As a general rule, the bank incurs the loss when it pays a check bearing the
customer's forged signature." I This system of loss allocation has contributed to
making the check a safe, reliable, convenient, and comfortable payment device
that has flourished despite the encroachment of attractive electronic payment
systems.12 Customers continue to use checks in increasing numbers because they
know that they are protected from loss as long as they act in a non-negligent,
reasonable manner.
Courts and commentators characterize this Code scheme as imposing strict
on the customer by subsection (I) the customer is precluded from asserting against the
bank
(a) his unauthorized signature... if the bank also establishes that it suffered a loss by
reason of such failure; and
(b) an unauthorized signature ... by the same wrongdoer on any other item paid in
good faith by the bank after the first item and statement was available to the customer for a
reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calendar days and before the bank receives notifi-
cation from the customer of any such unauthorized signature or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer establishes lack of
ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s).
10. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1.
11. Section 4-401 of the UCC authorizes a bank to pay only those checks that are "properly
payable." A check containing a forged signature should not be deemed properly payable and cannot
be charged against the depositor's account. U.C.C. § 3-404. See also Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 546 N.E.2d 904, 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613
(1989) (check with forged signature not properly payable by the bank); McDonnell, Bank Liability
for Fraudulent Checks.- The Clash of the Utilitarian and Paternalist Creeds Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 73 GEO. L.J. 1399, 1404 (1985) (depositor protected by UCC provisions even if bank
inspects the signature carefully).
12. G. MOEBS & E. MOEBS, PRICING FINANCIAL SERVICES 84-85 (1986) (Federal Reserve
data indicate customers' use of checks is continuing to rise); Paper Trail Not Abating, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENT AGE, Apr. 17, 1989, at 37 (volume of check use will increase substantially until 1993).
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liability upon banks since the bank is liable to its customer for paying a check
containing a forged signature regardless of how careful and reasonable its con-
duct. 13 According to Professor McDonnell, the strict liability principle has a
basis not only in the UCC, but also in the common law of contract. 14 To better
understand the legal relationship between the customer and the bank, it is neces-
sary to determine the nature of the contract between these parties.
B. The Contractual Relationship between Customers and Banks
By depositing money in the bank, the customer becomes the creditor of the
(debtor) bank. 15 The depositor thus has acquired contract rights vis-a-vis the
bank. 16 Courts characterize the agreement between these parties as either an
express or an implied contract. 17 The account's signature card is not only a
means of check verification, it is the express contract between the parties. 18 The
terms of the contract are gleaned from documents, such as the provisions of the
signature card and those of the UCC, which is deemed to have codified the im-
plied contract. 19 These writings are to be construed according to the intentions
of the bank and its customer.20 UCC section 4-401 imposes upon the bank the
13. See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1977) (bank
breaches contract with depositor and is held strictly liable when it pays on forged check); Putnam
Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 345, 546 N.E.2d at 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 613 (bank generally held
liable for forged check notwithstanding exercise of due care). See also E. RUBIN & R. COOTER, THE
PAYMENT SYSTEM 478 (1989) (payor bank strictly liable for paying check with forged signature);
McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1404 (bank liable even if forgery is perfect).
14. McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1404-05. McDonnell states: "The assumed contract operates
to impose strict liability on the bank for paying any type of unauthorized order." Id.
15. 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 9, § I at 1 (1983) [hereinafter MICHIE].
16. MICHIE, supra note 15, ch. 9, § I at 17; Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part 1 -
The Relevance of Contract Doctrine, 100 BANKING L.J. 220, 222 (1983).
17. See MICHIE, supra note 15, ch. 9, § 1 at 12-13, which states: "The express or implied
contract between a bank and its depositor creates and regulates the relationship between them." Id.
Implied in the debtor-creditor relationship is a contract, one of whose terms is the bank's promise
that it will pay only checks containing authorized signatures. K & K Mfg. v. Union Bank, 129 Ariz.
7, 11, 628 P.2d 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1981); Certified Grocers of Cal. v. San Gabriel Valley Bank, 150
Cal. App. 3d 281, 286-87, 197 Cal. Rptr. 710, 714 (1983) (bank operates under implied contract with
depositor when it accepts depositor's funds). The express terms of the agreement can be found in the
deposit agreement, the signature card, and the checks the customer draws. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. West, 244 Ga. 396, 399, 260 S.E.2d. 89, 91 (1979).
18. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 922, 702 P.2d 503, 509, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345,
551 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See also Dietrich v. Chemical Bank, 115 Misc.
2d. 713, 713-14, 454 N.Y.S.2d. 490, 491 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (depositor accepts rules and regulations of
bank upon signing signature card), aff'd, 92 A.D.2d 786, 459 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
The signature card is the contract that creates the checking account. MICHIE, supra note 15, ch. 9,
§ 1, at 20. The signature card is the contract that establishes the relationship between the bank and
the customer. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL PAPER TEACHING MATERI-
ALS 347 (1987). The signature card is an adhesion contract. Id.
19. Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 157, 304 A.2d 838, 842-43 (1973); Medford
Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 592-93, 676 P.2d 329, 333 (1984).
20. MICHIE, supra note 15, ch. 9, § 1, at 17-18; Symons, supra note 16, at 246.
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contractual duty to pay only those checks that are "properly payable."'2 1 Only
checks containing authorized signatures are considered properly payable. 22
Courts agree that there is a contractual relationship between the bank and
its customer, and that if the bank fails to comply with the Code's requirements
in regard to paying its customers' checks, it is breaking that contract. 23 This
consensus is helpful in developing a sound analytical framework for viewing the
banks' obligations when they process checks. For if we agree that courts should
proceed along the path of contractual analysis, we know we should look at fac-
tors relevant to that type of analysis - such as the expectations of the parties,
commercial reasonableness, usage of trade - and to a scheme of damages signif-
icantly different from tort damages. 24 The Code, however, imposes on banks a
standard of care derived from the law of torts. This blending of tort and con-
tract doctrines makes clear and consistent analysis difficult.
C. The Liability of the Negligent Customer
Although the bank ordinarily is liable to the customer when it pays a check
bearing a forged customer signature, there are two situations in which the Code
shifts from a framework based on the bank's strict liability in contract 25 to one
that focuses on the tort concept of the customer's negligence. 26 The first in-
stance of potential customer liability for loss involves the preparation and issu-
ance of the check. If the customer's conduct is negligent, and the "negligence
substantially contributes... to the making of an unauthorized signature[,]" the
loss falls on the customer.27 For example, when the customer leaves a book of
blank checks in an unlocked cabinet in an unused storeroom, and the checks are
stolen, the customer's signature forged, and the checks cashed, the customer
must bear the lOSS. 28
The second situation in which the loss may be shifted to the customer oc-
curs after the customer's bank pays the check. The customer bears the loss if,
after receiving the bank's periodic statement, he or she fails to "exercise reason-
able care and promptness to examine" the statement, discover forgeries, and
21. Taylor, 269 Md. at 157, 304 A.2d at 842; Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 591, 676
P.2d at 333.
22. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 592-93, 676 P.2d at 332.
23. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contractual relation-
ship between the bank and customers and violations of that contract when the bank improperly pays
checks.
24. Note, "Contort:" Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts - Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
510, 525 n.92 (1985).
25. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note at 309 (1979) [hereinafter I
RESTATEMENT]. ("Contract liability is strict liability.")
26. See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1977) (fault occupies
secondary role in UCC treatment of forgery losses).
27. U.C.C. § 3-406. The loss is on the bank, however, if it failed to pay the check in accordance
with reasonable commercial standards. Id.
28. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. First Alabama Bank, 636 F.2d 1051, 1053 (5th Cir.
1981).
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"promptly" notify the bank. 29 If the same person forges his or her signature on
more than one of the customer's checks, and the customer fails to report the
forgeries to the bank within a reasonable period 30 after receiving from the bank
the first forged check and the accompanying statement, the bank is not required
to recredit the customer's account for anything more than the amount of the
first check. 3 1
D. Liability Reverts to Bank if it Fails to Exercise Ordinary Care
The loss allocation process does not stop with finding the customer negli-
gent, however. Even if the customer fails to report promptly any forged signa-
tures after receiving the bank's statement, the customer can shift the loss to the
bank if he or she can establish the bank's "lack of ordinary care" in paying the
check. 32
1. Ordinary Care in its "Normal Tort Meaning"
The comment to UCC section 4-103 points out that the Code does not de-
fine ordinary care, but also states the drafters' intention that courts use the term
in its "normal tort meaning and not in any special sense related to bank collec-
tions."' 33 The New York Court of Appeals utilized the language of the comment
to support its conclusion that "a customer could prove a bank lacked ordinary
care by presenting any type of proof that the bank failed to act reasonably." 34
Several objections can be made to the comment and to the New York
court's interpretation of it. The comment is mistaken when it suggests that
courts give ordinary care its "normal tort meaning" by judging the bank's con-
duct in processing checks without any regard to check collection. The classic
tort approach is to determine whether negligence is present by deciding whether
the conduct of the party charged with negligence is reasonable within the con-
text of the circumstances in which the party acted. 35 Negligence involves a bal-
29. U.C.C. §§ 4-406(1)-(2). "Reasonable care" apparently has the same meaning as "ordinary
care." See Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185, 218
(1967) (whether drafters of UCC gave consideration to inherent ambiguity of language of standard
of care uncertain). Professors Rubin and Cooter label this a per se negligence rule since the customer
is deemed negligent as a matter of law. E. RUBIN & R. COOTER, supra note 13, at 527.
30. The reasonable period may not exceed fourteen calendar days. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b).
31. Id. See also Flagship Bank v. Complete Interiors, Inc., 450 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS
8.02[4][b], at 8-27 (3d ed. 1990). But see Winkler v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 42 Mich. App. 740,
745, 202 N.W.2d 468, 470-71 (1972) (whether customer reported within reasonable time second
forged check that bank paid within fourteen days from time customer received first forged check and
statement is question for trier of fact).
32. U.C.C. § 4-406(3).
33. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4.
34. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 546
N.E.2d 904, 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (1989). By showing that under the bank's procedures there
was "no realistic opportunity to detect forged checks," the customer presented the required proof of
unreasonableness. Id. at 346, 546 N.E.2d at 907, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
35. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37 (5th ed. 1984). Keeton
states: "The question ... is what the reasonable person would have done under the circumstances."
1990]
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ancing of the risk taken by the party whose conduct is under question, and the
"probability and extent of the harm," against the "social value of the interest"
that party is promoting. 3 6 Ordinary care, therefore, cannot be judged in a vac-
uum. The reasonableness of the conduct must be determined in light of the
situation presented. Consequently, ordinary care in the context of the bank col-
lection process must include a consideration of the bank's conduct in that
process.
Whereas the first paragraph of the comment to section 4-103 seeks to di-
vorce ordinary care from its banking context, section 4-103(3) and the second
paragraph of the comment take the opposite approach. Section 4-103(3) pro-
vides that action or nonaction consistent with a "general banking usage not dis-
approved by this Article, primafacie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care." 37
Moreover, the comment states that in determining bank usage, the court should
consider the practices of other banks and suggests the appropriate geographical
scope of what constitutes general banking usage. 38 The statement in the com-
ment that ordinary care in its normal tort sense means that the bank's conduct
should be considered without regard to the bank's check collection practices,
therefore, is contrary to the accompanying statutory provision, other language
in the same comment, and general tort law. 39
Id. Keeton further states: "[Evidence of the usual and customary conduct of others under similar
circumstances is normally relevant and admissible .. " Id. § 33. See generally J. HuRsT, DEAL-
ING WITH STATUTES 58 (1982) (legislatures should be presumed to intend that words have their
ordinary meaning).
36. W. KEETON, supra note 35, § 31.
37. U.C.C. § 4-103(3). But see Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 375 (1952) (section 4-103 renders Article 4 of Code objectionable). The
meaning of the phrase "usage not disapproved by this Article" is not apparent because the Code does
not disapprove of any particular banking usage. 2 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION
REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1264 (Reprint ed. 1980). Section 4-103's
reference to general banking usage, standing alone, is consistent both with a tort and a contract
theory of liability. What constitutes negligence is determined by the standards of conduct of the
community where the activity occurred. It is, therefore, relevant to consider the "usual and custom-
ary conduct of others under similar circumstances." W. KEETON, supra note 35, § 33. Usage is also
an integral element in contract analysis, 2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220 (1979)
[hereinafter 2 RESTATEMENT], and is incorporated in U.C.C. section 1-205 which applies to all
transactions under the Code. That section provides that usage "give[s] particular meaning to and
supplement[s] or qualif[ies] [the] terms of an agreement." U.C.C. § 1-205(3). Whereas this provi-
sion relates to contract interpretation, § 4-103(3)'s reference to general banking usage relates to the
negligence concept of ordinary care. U.C.C. § 4-103(3).
38. General banking usage means the common practices engaged in by banks operating in the
geographical area of the bank under consideration. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4. To be considered a
general banking usage, more than two or three banks must engage in a practice, but a practice need
not be country-wide. Id.
39. Professor Phillips suggests negligence under the Code may be somewhat narrower than the
general standard of negligence. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228, 228
n.2 (1982). The focus of Professor Phillips' article is not on the situation where both parties are
negligent, as in § 4-406 cases. Id. at 229 n.4.
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2. Ordinary Care and the Morals of the Marketplace
Article 4's approach to ordinary care is similar to that used in the UCC's
Article 2, which governs the sale of goods. Rather than providing detailed defini-
tions of terms and carefully setting out the law, Article 2 requires parties' con-
duct to conform to the general standard of "commercial reasonableness."' 4
Courts give meaning to the term by discovering what practices are considered
reasonable by the business community. 41 As a result, Article 2 reaffirms "the
predominant morals of the marketplace." '42
Section 4-103(3) follows the same tack. It does not require any specific
bank conduct. Neither ordinary care nor general banking usage is defined. To
make out a prima facie case of ordinary care, the bank need only prove that its
practices conform to the standards of current commerce. 43 The court will not
automatically approve the "morals of the marketplace," however. The customer
can prevail if he or she can establish that general banking practice is "unreasona-
ble, arbitrary, or unfair." 44 As one court stated the test: the customer has the
burden of showing that the "entire industry's practice is unreasonable." '45
Although the Code provides the customer with this thin reed, the entire thrust
of section 4-103(3) is toward codifying whatever current practice may be.
Professor Danzig criticizes the Article 2 approach, not only because it is
designed to further " 'the purposes of business instead of [being used] as a body
of means toward general social ends,' "46 but also because, instead of achieving
Llewellyn's goal of the regularization of the law, it has the opposite result of
frustrating the Code's goals of simplification, clarification, and uniformity.4 7
Since Article 2 often uses general terms, such as "commercial reasonableness,"
instead of spelling out what conduct is required, judges are free to "discover"
that current practices are whatever conform to the judges' value systems. 48 As a
result, the law is unpredictable, varying from case to case, depending upon
whim. Likewise, because Article 4 fails to define ordinary care and general
banking usage, acceptable bank practice varies from case to case, depending
upon the predilections of the judge or jury and upon the facts and procedural
posture of each case.4 9
40. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 621, 626 (1975) (quoting K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 629.
43. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4.
44. Id.; Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir.
1988); McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
45. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294 (emphasis added).
46. Danzig, supra note 40, at 630 (quoting Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44
HARV. L. REV. 697, 708 (1931)).
47. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (statement of goals of UCC).
48. Danzig, supra note 40, at 626.
49. See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of varied factual contexts
and procedural settings that have led to inconsistent interpretations of ordinary care.
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3. General Banking Usage Contrasted with Usage of Trade
The meaning of "general banking usage" in Article 4 can be understood
better by comparing it to another Code concept known as "usage of trade." '5
The entire focus of section 4-103 is on judging one bank's conduct by comparing
it to what other banks do. In contrast, section 1-205 employs the concept of
usage of trade to decide what constitutes the terms of the contract between the
parties. 5 1 As in general banking usage under section 4-103, usage of trade is
determined by reference to how others in that line of business conduct them-
selves. 52 Unlike section 4-103, however, what other businesses are doing is not
the exclusive focus under section 1-205. Instead, the focus is on the parties to
the contract. Where the contract is silent or ambiguous, the parties are bound
by trade usage,5 3 but only if the party who will be bound by the usage had
either actual or constructive knowledge of the same. 54 Courts do not find con-
structive knowledge unless a usage has "general and universal application. '55
Moreover, a person who is a newcomer to the field cannot be charged with con-
structive knowledge. 56 Thus, usage of trade should not be read automatically
into the terms of the contract, because there are occasions where a party cannot
justifiably be expected to follow such usage.57
Applying the trade usage standards of section 1-205 to bank practices for
reviewing checks with forged signatures would produce results different from
those produced if courts apply the general banking usage test of section 4-103.
Because practices differ so greatly among banks, 58 it is not clear that there is
indeed any usage of trade.59 Banks do not disclose to the public their proce-
dures for reviewing checks for forged signatures, apparently out of concern that
50. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (defines "usage of trade").
51. U.C.C. § 1-205(5). Usage of trade is one factor employed to determine the "commercial
meaning of the agreement" and to provide terms with respect to those issues that are not explicitly
agreed upon. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 4.
52. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 5. The comment states: "[F]ull recognition" should be given to
the practices of "the great majority of decent dealers." Id.
53. U.C.C. § 1-205(1). The parties may also be bound by course of dealing. Id. Course of
dealing applies where the parties have engaged in similar transactions prior to their conduct under
the instant contract. Id. comment 2.
54. Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, 59 Cal. App. 3d 948, 957, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 183, 189 (1976).
55. Id.
56. United States v. Haas & Haynie Corp., 577 F.2d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 1978).
57. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 1981); U.C.C.
§ 1-205(2) (usage of trade is practice so regular that it justifies "expectation that it will be
observed").
58. Compare Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d
340, 344, 546 N.E.2d 904, 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1989) (sight review of all checks) with Mc-
Dowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (no review of
any checks).
59. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (practice must have "such regularity of observance" that one is justified
in expecting it will be observed).
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such disclosure would encourage wrongdoing.60 Consequently, customers lack
actual knowledge, and cannot be presumed to know of the usage unless it has
"general and universal application. '61 Because there is no uniformity, the
bank's practices are not usage of trade and cannot be incorporated into the con-
tract. In contrast, a bank may be able to prove its practices come within the
meaning of general banking usage under section 4-103 if it can present testimony
from an expert witness or bank officers that only some other banks use compara-
ble procedures. 62 The bank is not required to relate bank practices to the cus-
tomer's knowledge and to the standard for determining trade usage under
section 1-205.63
4. Ordinary Care within a Contract Cause of Action
Section 4-406 is remarkable because it allows negligence to be asserted as a
defense in a contract action. The bank's lack of due care does not give rise to an
independent negligence claim. Instead, the Code injects the tort concept of ordi-
nary care into a cause of action in contract. The bank breaches its contract with
the customer when it pays a check bearing a forged signature.64 If the customer
is negligent by failing to report forged signatures, however, the customer is "pre-
cluded" from asserting the unauthorized signatures against the bank that pays
the check.65 Section 4-406 is based on the theory of estoppel. 66 The term "pre-
cluded" is meant to "recognize the possibility of an estoppel" against a person
whose negligence should prevent that person from contesting the validity of a
signature. 67 The customer's negligence is not in the nature of an independent
tort. Rather, the underlying theory is contract: 68 the customer's negligence pre-
cludes the customer from obtaining a judgment that the bank is liable for breach
of contract; it allows the bank to escape contractual liability.69
The bank's failure to exercise ordinary care must be seen as a loss of this
defense. 70 Under section 4-406(3), if the bank fails to exercise ordinary care, the
preclusion no longer applies. 7 1 In other words, the customer is no longer es-
topped; he or she can assert the bank's negligence in bringing an action on the
60. Murray, Price v. Neal in the Electronic Age: An Empirical Survey, 87 BANKING L.J. 686,
692 (1970).
61. Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, 59 Cal. App. 3d 948, 957-58, 131
Cal. Rptr. 183, 189 (1976).
62. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988).
63. Compare U.C.C. § 4-103 (requirement for general banking usage test) with U.C.C. § 1-205
(sets forth trade usage standard).
64. U.C.C. § 3-404(1); B. CLARK, supra note 31, 8.02, at 8-5.
65. U.C.C. § 4-406(2).
66. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 689 (3d ed. 1988).
67. U.C.C. § 3-404 comment 4.
68. R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 153, 48 A.2d 420, 426
(1946).
69. Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v. National City Bank, 285 A.D. 182, 186, 136 N.Y.S.2d 139,
144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 1023, 127 N.E.2d 864 (1955).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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contract against the bank for paying the check and debiting the customer's ac-
count. 72 The bank's negligence does not give the depositor an independent
cause of action in tort. Instead, the customer's complaint should be phrased in
terms of the bank negligently performing its duties under its contract with the
customer.
73
The conclusion that the bank's negligence is properly viewed within the
context of a contract violation is also supported by the Code's measure of dam-
ages. Under section 4-103(5), the customer who proves that the bank failed to
exercise ordinary care is entitled to the amount of the check reduced by the
amount that the customer would have lost even if the bank had exercised ordi-
nary care. 74 At least one court has ruled that the customer must show it suf-
fered loss as a result of the bank's breach of contract, but the customer is not
required to show proximate cause as would be necessary if the bank's negligence
gave rise to an independent cause of action in tort. 7" Thus, if the Code intended
the bank's negligence to give rise to an independent tort, the customer would
have to prove proximate cause and section 4-103(5) would authorize traditional
tort damages. 76
At first blush, it would seem that finding the bank negligent within the
confines of the parties' contract strengthens the bank's position in regard to re-
viewing checks for forgeries. Under a contract analysis, the bank is protected
from the greater damages a tort action could bring.7 7 In addition, the Code
shifts the burdens of proof to the customer in favor of the bank. Before the UCC
was enacted, the law of many states placed the burden on the bank to prove it
exercised ordinary care before it could assert the customer's negligence as an
affirmative defense. 78 Under section 4-406(3), the burden is on the customer to
prove that the bank did not exercise ordinary care. 79 The shifting of the burden,
as well as the way in which the Code uses general banking usage to determine
ordinary care, 80 indicates that the purpose of the Code was to favor the bank's
72. Id.
73. H.B.A. Fur Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
955, 956 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). See also R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 72
R.I. 144, 153, 48 A.2d 420, 426 (1946) (contract serves as basis of liability, not bank's negligence);
Penney, Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks and Article Four in the Electronic Age, 65 MIcH. L.
REv. 1341, 1350 (1967) (bank's liability based on breach of contractual obligation to customer).
74. U.C.C. § 4-103(5).
75. Isaac v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 675 P.2d 742, 747 (Colo. 1984).
76. Note, supra note 24, at 525 n.92. Damages in tort are designed to put injured persons in as
good a position as they were in prior to being injured. Id. Tort remedies include consequential
damages for negligence. Philippine Airlines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3d 234,
239-40, 234 Cal. Rptr. 423, 425 (1987). Under § 4-103(5), the customer can recover consequential
damages only if the bank acted in bad faith.
77. Note, supra note 24, at 525 n.92.
78. R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 153, 48 A.2d 420, 426
(1946).
79. U.C.C. § 4-406(3). See supra note 9 for the relevant text of this section.
80. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of conduct that is consistent
with general bank practices and that constitutes ordinary care under the UCC.
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interests over those of the customer. 8' It would be consistent with this purpose
to apply the ordinary care standard in a manner that permits banks maximum
flexibility in establishing procedures to review checks for forged signatures.
The pre-Code case law, however, did not emasculate the customer's rights
when it characterized these actions as based on contract. Courts stressed the
"high standard of contractual responsibility" imposed on banks when paying
their customers' money.8 2 The Rhode Island Supreme Court seemed to believe
this contractual obligation imposed stricter requirements upon banks than the
duty to exercise due care.83
The UCC does not purport to undermine this fundamental contractual rela-
tionship between the parties and the pre-Code cases which gave meaning to that
relationship. To the contrary, the Code affirms freedom of contract 84 and pro-
vides that, unless displaced by the UCC, non-UCC concepts, such as estoppel,
supplement the provisions of the Code. 85 The challenge facing the courts is how
to apply the tort concept of negligence in a way that is consistent with its confus-
ing Code treatment, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the con-
tractual relationship between the bank and customer.
E. The Parties' Contract and the Bank's Duty to Verify Signatures
Case law stresses the primacy of the contract between the bank and the
customer, and suggests that the tort concept of ordinary care be given meaning,
not as an independent tort, but within the context of that contract.86 It is appro-
priate, therefore, for courts to determine the contractual terms relating to the
bank's duty to review the customer's signature,87 and then to attempt to apply
81. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [7] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J.
334, 361-62 (1952) (drafters "sold out" to bank lobby for support of Code); Gilmore, supra note 37,
at 374-75 (1952) (bank counsel drafted Article 4 to favor banking interests); Leary & Schmitt, Some
Bad News and Some Good News From Articles Three and Four, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 613-14 (1982)
(banks played active role in creation of UCC).
82. Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v. National City Bank, 285 A.D. 182, 184, 136 N.Y.S.2d 139,
142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 1023, 127 N.E.2d 864 (1955).
83. R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 153, 48 A.2d 420, 426 (1946).
The Kimball court stated:
[S]pecial burdens are placed upon the bank in that regard because of the nature of the
relationship and its primary duty under the contract. That contractual obligation is not to
be confused with or transformed into a duty merely to use due care, or to be completely
nullified by modifications.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3) (parties may vary most provisions and standards by agreement); 4-
103(1) (same).
85. U.C.C. § 1-103.
86. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contractual nature of
the bank-customer relationship. See also supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the contractual basis for the customer's cause of action where the bank fails to exercise ordinary
care.
87. See generally J. VERGARI, COMPUTERIZED PAYMENT OPERATIONS LAW 113 (1989) (con-
tract between bank and customer more important than ever in computerized check processing
system).
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the ordinary care standard in a manner that is both consistent with a contractual
analysis and UCC section 4-103(3). Unfortunately, in a typical case, the court
may have great difficulty construing the parties' contract.
Examination of the terms of a contract begins with the writing itself. How-
ever, most contracts governing checking accounts do not contain provisions spe-
cifically related to the bank's duty in regard to signature verification.8 8
Nevertheless, the court should peruse the parties' written documents because
they may spell out the bank's duty. But even if they do, the court cannot stop
there, because the Code sets certain restrictions on the freedom of the parties to
establish the bank's responsibilities.8 9 Consequently, the provisions of the con-
tract may not be enforceable.
If the parties' writings say nothing about signature verification, the court
can look to the UCC for guidance on how to treat a contract that omits an
important term. The contract is the "legal obligation which results from the
parties' agreement." 9 The agreement consists of "the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances in-
cluding.., usage of trade." 91 Although contracts between banks and custom-
ers typically do not contain a specific provision relating to the bank's signature
review procedure, the presence of the signature card, which constitutes one por-
tion of the parties' contract, may constitute "other circumstances" from which a
court could determine the parties' bargain in fact.92 Further, it is reasonable to
assume that bank customers believe that the signature card is intended as a
handwriting exemplar to be used by the bank to verify whether the signature on
a check corresponds to the customer's signature.93 This expectation is sup-
88. Cases in which signature verification was at issue do not mention any contract provisions
pertaining to signature verification. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp.,
848 F.2d 291, 293 (st Cir. 1988) (reasonable commercial standards are equivalent to ordinary care);
Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, 135 Il. 2d 121, 128, 552 N.E.2d 783, 787 (1990)
(ordinary care standard applies); Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
74 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 546 N.E.2d 904, 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (1989) (customer must establish
that bank acted without ordinary care); Medford Irrigation District v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App.
589, 591, 676 P.2d 329, 331 (1984) (reasonable commercial standards apply). Examples of deposit
agreements and signature cards, none of which contains language relating to signature verification,
may be found in 2 J. KUSNET & J. ANTOPOL, MODERN BANKING FORMS 8-10 to 8-13 (3d ed. 1981);
T. QUINN & R. QUINN, MODERN BANKING FORMS 301-06 (1969); R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J.
WHITE, supra note 18, at 365-70; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, at 752 n.1, 753 n.2.
89. U.C.C. § 4-103(1). See infra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.C.C.
§ 4-103(1), as well as the prohibition against an agreement by which the bank may disclaim responsi-
bility or limit damages for its negligence.
90. U.C.C. § 1-201(11).
91. U.C.C. § 1-201(3). 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 204 provides that when the parties
have not agreed with respect to an essential term, the court may supply a term that "is reasonable in
the circumstances." Comment d accompanying § 204 further elucidates the standard by suggesting
that the court supply a term that "comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather
than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process." Id. comment d.
92. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the means by which the con-
tract terms are derived from various sources, including the signature card.
93. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 922, 928, 702 P.2d 503, 509, 513, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 351, 355 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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ported by empirical evidence: a 1986 study conducted by the American Bankers
Association found that 24% of the 3,400 banks surveyed with assets between
$100 million and $500 million verified signatures on all checks before
payment.
94
Do the customer's expectations concerning the meaning of the signature
card become part of the parties' bargain, resulting in a bank's duty to verify
signatures? Customers can argue that the meaning they attached to the signa-
ture card represents the public's common understanding of the function of the
card. The bank may counter that it had no reason to know that the signature
card would have that meaning to the customer. If the customer is a business, the
bank can argue that it was reasonable for the bank to believe a business would be
sophisticated enough to know that not all banks verify signatures. Contract law
has developed doctrines addressing differing expectations of the parties. Ac-
cording to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, if the customer had no reason
to know the bank was attaching a meaning different from the customer's, and if
the bank had reason to know the customer thought the signature card meant the
bank would verify customer signatures, the contract should be interpreted in
accordance with the customer's meaning. 95
Customers can claim that they never would have entered into the checking
account agreement if they had realized it did not require the bank to examine
signatures and that the bank would hold the customer responsible for losses if
the customer did not promptly report forgeries. They can point to the structure
of the UCC, which generally protects the customer and places the loss upon the
bank if it pays a check with a forged signature.96 They can contend that a pri-
mary reason for having a checking account, as opposed to using other methods
of transferring money, is to obtain protection from the unauthorized use of their
funds, and that a contract that is interpreted to free the bank from the duty to
verify signatures is contrary to their expectations.
The bank can argue that it had no reason to believe the customer would
have refused to sign the card if it had known the bank did not engage in signa-
ture verification. Moreover, the UCC does not protect the customer from all
forgeries. If the customer is negligent within the terms of section 3-406 or 4-
406(2), the loss falls on the customer, unless the bank also neglected to meet
Code standards. Therefore, it is not reasonable for customers to regard such
protection as the dominant purpose of a checking account.
Courts may be expected to shy away from determining the bank's duty to
verify signatures on the basis of the above arguments because any determination
requires the court to engage in such imponderables as deducing the common
understanding of customers as to the function of the signature card. Further-
94. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL OPERATIONS/AUTOMATION SURVEY
1986, 119 Table 35E (1987) [hereinafter SURVEY] (many banks require handwriting exemplars for
purposes of verifying signatures). See also Murray, supra note 60, at 700-01 (84 of 91 banks surveyed
compare check signatures with signature card).
95. 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 201(2)(b).
96. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bank's strict liability
for forged checks.
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more, these arguments force the court to conduct a subjective evaluation of what
was in the minds of each customer when he or she signed the card and what the
bank had reason to know.97
Even if courts were to engage in a traditional contract analysis, however,
barriers would remain to frustrate attempts to give meaning to the term "ordi-
nary care." Assuming a court agreed with the customer's contentions, it must
then determine how the bank can perform its contractual duty to verify signa-
tures. At one extreme, the court could decide the contract requires the bank to
engage in sight review of every check or bear the loss. At the other extreme, the
court could decide the bank's contractual obligation is merely to verify signa-
tures in over-the-counter transactions. The basic problem is that the rules for
interpreting the impact of the signature card on the bank's contractual obliga-
tions do not provide sufficient guidance as to the meaning of ordinary care.
9 8
In addition, determining the bank's duty by focusing on each party's inten-
tions, expectations, and the knowledge of the other party's expectations is incon-
sistent with the approach taken in section 4-103(3) and its accompanying
comment. That section and its comment ignore contractual analysis and instead
direct the court's attention to the bank's practices vis-a-vis other banks. Section
4-103(3) could be read as telling courts that if the parties have not clearly spelled
out the bank's duties, courts should not read things into their agreement.9 9
Banks could strengthen their position by the careful drafting of their con-
tracts with customers. The agreement, for example, might provide that the bank
has no duty to engage in sight review of all checks, or specify that the parties
agree that the bank's practice of examining only those checks above a certain
amount, to be determined by the bank, constitutes the exercise of ordinary care.
The difficulty with this tactic is that the UCC provides that "no agreement can
disclaim a bank's responsibility for its ... failure to exercise ordinary care or can
limit the measure of damages for such . . . failure.' '1 ° The validity of such
contractual terms, therefore, again depends upon what constitutes ordinary care.
Unless courts determine what ordinary care requires, it is impossible to know if
such contract provisions amount to a disclaimer of ordinary care.
This examination of the UCC's scheme of loss allocation demonstrates that
the Code does a poor job of providing courts with guidance on how to determine
what constitutes ordinary care in regard to signature verification under section
97. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 42 (1974) (if court uses parties'
intentions and beliefs to construe contract, it must engage in thorough examination of facts).
98. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides another potential basis for determining the parties' bargain by
stating that conduct that conforms to the "usage of the trade" constitutes an implied term of the
contract where the contract is silent. Id. The concept of trade usage, however, does not substan-
tially assist courts in deciding banks' duties in regard to signature verification. See supra notes 58-61
and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in applying trade usage because of the varied
bank practices in connection with signature verification.
99. U.C.C. § 4-103(3). Section 4-103(3) currently provides in pertinent part: "(3) Action or
non-action approved by this Article... constitutes the exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence
of special instructions, action or non-action consistent with . . . a general banking usage not disap-
proved by this Article, prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary care."
100. U.C.C. § 4-103(1).
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4-406(3). Examination of a proposed framework adapted from the field of eco-
nomics will provide useful insights for a consideration of how courts confronted
with section 4-406(3) disputes have interpreted and applied the Code, and for
evaluating the revised UCC.
II. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF Loss ALLOCATION
Professors Cooter and Rubin have formulated a "modified economic analy-
sis" 0 1 that provides a useful additional perspective on the issues raised by sec-
tion 4-406(3).102 Cooter and Rubin posit three operative principles-loss
spreading, loss reduction, and loss imposition-and derive from them generally
applicable rules. 10 3 Examination of these principles suggests that the UCC does
not take into account all relevant factors in assigning liability for losses associ-
ated with improperly negotiated checks. The construction of viable legal rules,
however, does not follow easily or ineluctably from an application of these
principles.
A. The Loss Spreading Principle
According to the loss spreading principle, loss should be imposed upon the
party that can bear the risk at the lowest cost. 104 Ability to bear the risk depends
on the relative size of the loss-whether it is small or large in proportion to the
party's total wealth, and whether that party can spread the loss by charging its
customers a little more and still remain competitive.
No general rule of loss allocation can be derived from this principle. If the
customer is a large corporation and the bank is small, as are many credit unions,
or in a weak financial condition, as are many thrifts, or in a highly competitive
market, the business customer may be better able to bear the risk. If the cus-
tomer is a small business in a highly competitive market, however, the bank may
be better able to bear the risk. Only if the customer is an individual consumer
does this principle suggest a consistent answer. For individual consumers, the
size of the loss is generally a much larger proportion of their wealth and they
cannot spread the loss. 10 5 Also, if courts tried to apply the loss-spreading princi-
ple to business customers, they would have to engage in extensive fact-finding,
such as examining financial statements, exploring the cost and availability of
insurance, and determining the competitiveness of the customer's market as
compared to the bank's. Inevitably, there would be close cases where, for exam-
101. Cooter & Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63,
66 (1987).
102. Although the Cooter-Rubin discussion is confined to transactions between consumers and
banks, it provides a framework that may apply equally well to any customer lacking the bargaining
power to protect itself through contract negotiations with the bank. Id. at 69 n.35. Individual cus-
tomers and small businesses suffer from the same disproportionate negotiation costs and asymmetri-
cal access to information. Id. at 69.
103. See infra notes 104-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rules developed
within the Cooter-Rubin system of loss treatment.
104. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 71.
105. Id. at 72.
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pie, both the customer and the bank are equally capable of bearing the loss.
Banks and customers need a principle that results in a rule that is far more
uniform and certain.
B. The Loss Reduction Principle
One objective of the law should be to prevent injury from occurring in the
first place. The loss reduction principle seeks to accomplish this by assigning
liability to the party who can reduce losses at the lowest cost.10 6 According to
Cooter and Rubin, this principle consists of four elements: precaution, techno-
logical innovation, responsiveness, and learning.107
1. Taking Precautions
In analyzing the loss reduction principle, an initial consideration is which
party can take precautions against the loss at the lowest cost.108 This element is
often considered by the courts. 1 9 In many cases, the customer can take precau-
tions at the lowest cost. The customer has far fewer checks to review than the
bank, and the customer knows its signature far better than does the bank. Busi-
ness customers can greatly reduce the probability of forged customer signatures
by having different employees prepare checks and reconcile the monthly state-
ment. 110 To prevent employees from conspiring to defraud the company, the
company could institute random inspection of the books by one of the officers or
occasional surprise visits by outside accountants."' A legal rule that provides
incentives for careful review of the monthly statement results in better overall
business practices. 112 Companies should review their statements for possible
bank errors and check alterations in addition to possible forgeries.
Adopting precautionary procedures can be very costly for small businesses,
however. Often the same person prepares the checks and reconciles the monthly
statement because the business can afford to have only one person handling the
bookkeeping. 113 Time spent by the employer supervising the bookkeeper's work
106. Id. at 73.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 74.
109. See, e.g., Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. First Nat'l Bank, 698 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D. Md.
1988) (UCC increases banking efficiency by placing burden on bank as party best situated to prevent
fraud); Northpark Nat'l Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 572 F. Supp. 524, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (UCC
policy places fraud losses on party in best position to prevent them).
110. J. WILLINGHAM & D. CARMICHAEL, AUDITING CONCEPTS AND METHODS 217 (2d ed.
1975) (one person should not handle every aspect of transaction).
111. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 4, Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufactur-
ers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 546 N.E.2d 940, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1989) (No. 2290-86) (in-
dependent accountants inspected books on unscheduled basis).
112. J. WILLINGHAM & D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 110, at 216-17 (sound internal control
procedures require segregation of duties).
113. AMERICAN INSTrUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION OF STATE-
MENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS 65 (1984) [hereinafter CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS] (busi-
ness not expected to adopt method of internal control methods costing more than anticipated
benefits).
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is time away from purchasing, producing, and selling. The huge number of small
businesses that fail each year is an indication of the great demands on the time of
managers, as well as small profit margins, and fierce competition.' 1 4
Upon initial consideration, it seems fair to impose liability on individual
consumers since they are subject to lower costs when they take precautions. As
a practical matter, however, it appears that many consumers do not reconcile
their bank statements. 115 We could conclude that the law should not adopt a
paternalistic approach when it results in increased bank costs that are then
passed on to even conscientious consumers. 1 6 It is not quite that simple, how-
ever. Even if we ignore the difficulties faced by those who are unable to monitor
satisfactorily their accounts, including, for example, those with limited math and
reading skills, modern technological advances have made the task of reconciling
statements much more difficult than it used to be. For example, if the consumer
has electronic fund transfer services such as direct deposit and preauthorized bill
paying, the statement will contain far more data than the statement of
yesteryear. 117
Even more problematic is the plight of the consumer whose checks are
truncated. 118 Truncation is the check processing system in which the customer
does not receive cancelled checks with the bank statement. Instead, the checks
or copies of them are retained by the customer's bank, the depository bank, or
another bank or check servicing center. All federal credit union checks are trun-
cated, 119 and an increasing number of customers at thrifts and commercial
banks also are agreeing to participate in this system. 120 The consumer with a
truncated account never receives cancelled checks. He or she must examine the
statement for discrepancies between it and the checkbook stub and carbonless
copies of the checks written that month. Moreover, the customer still will not
know if any discrepancy was caused by a forged customer's signature. That can-
not be ascertained until the customer obtains a copy of the check from the bank.
Because the bank may not have its own copy, it may have to obtain a copy from
114. Bankruptcy Cases Up 33% for N. Georgia during 3rd Quarter, Atlanta Const., Oct. 21,
1989, at El, col. 5 (business bankruptcy filings in northern Georgia increased 70% over previous
year).
115. See Mallory, Many Can't Perform Checkbook-Balancing Act, Atlanta J. & Const., Jan. 8,
1990, at C1, col. 3 (banker estimates 50% of customer bank statements never opened).
116. See McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1433 (paternalistic view advocates that all customers pay
more rather than placing full cost of fraud on victim).
117. 12 C.F.R. § 205.9(b) (1990). See also D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELEC-
TRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS 4.05[4], at 4-10 to 4-11 (2d ed. 1988) (federal regulation re-
quires information regarding preauthorized payments to be included in periodic statement).
118. D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL, supra note 117, 2.02[2][1], at 2-13.
119. Rubin, supra note 1, at 633.
120. D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL, supra note 117, 2.02[2][a]-[b], at 2-14 to 2-21 (truncation is
clearly wave of future as demonstrated by increased use by financial institutions); B. CLARK, supra
note 31, 12.02[1], at 12-3 (same). It is unclear whether truncated checks are governed by U.C.C.
§ 4-406. See Florida Fed. Say. & Loan v. Martin, 400 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (bank
defense under U.C.C. § 4-406 unavailable when checks not dispatched for customer inspection); B.
CLARK, supra note 31, 1 12.02[2], at 12-3 to 12-5 (effect of widespread check truncation practice
uncertain).
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whomever is storing the check. 121 While section 4-406 requires the customer to
report unauthorized signatures promptly, 122 presumably courts will find that
customers meet that requirement if the customer promptly notifies the bank that
something is wrong, even if it will be impossible to know the cause of the prob-
lem until the cancelled checks are retrieved.
While a strong argument can be made that even customers whose checks
are truncated can take precautions at a lower cost than banks, recent technologi-
cal developments may alter that assessment. A "static signature verification"
system that uses electronic equipment to discover discrepancies between the cus-
tomer's signature on file and signatures on the customer's checks presently is
being marketed to banks. 123 If the system is available at a reasonable price, the
bank may become the party that can take precautions at a lower overall cost.
Under the Code, when the customer reports forgeries promptly, the bank is lia-
ble for those checks it pays. 124 Even if the customer is negligent in failing to
report forged signatures promptly, the bank is liable for the first check.125 The
static signature verification system would enable the bank to identify those for-
geries for which it would be responsible in any event. Presumably, the bank
would alert its customer who would take steps to prevent further forgeries. The
amount banks might save by employing this "early warning system" could be
greater than the cost of the equipment.
Cooter and Rubin recognize that in some situations both parties can take
precautions. 12 6 For example, in some section 4-406 scenarios, the customer can
take the precaution of reviewing cancelled checks, and the bank can verify the
customer's signature by comparing it to the signature card. Where both can take
precautions, Cooter and Rubin recommend that the law adopt a standard that
will motivate both parties to do so.1 27 Contributory and comparative negligence
are appropriate legal doctrines to accomplish this. While some lower courts
have found comparative negligence to be the correct solution, this approach is
not in the UCC, and has been rejected by courts that have found it is inconsis-
tent with the Code's provisions. 128
2. Technological Innovation
The goal of the second element of the loss reduction principle is to allocate
121. See D. BAKER & R. BRANDEL, supra note 117, 2.02[2][b], at 2-20 to 2-21 (transfer of
information from "keeper" institution to "payor" institution can be accomplished via automated
clearinghouse).
122. U.C.C. § 4-406(1).
123. Kutler, Enhanced Static System Uses Less Computer Power, Am. Banker, May 25, 1988, at
6, col. 1.
124. U.C.C. § 4-406(1).
125. U.C.C. § 4-406(2). See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the re-
quirement that the bank recredit a customer's account for the first check in a series of forgeries.
126. See generally Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101.
127. Id. at 90.
128. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 348,
546 N.E.2d 904, 908, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 615 (1989) (trial court erred by importing comparative
negligence concepts into the UCC).
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liability in a manner that creates an incentive for developing innovations "that
reduce both the cost of precaution and the frequency of losses.' 29 Therefore,
liability should be imposed upon the party "most likely to develop innovative
methods of precaution."130 The most promising innovation in the area of forged
signatures is the "static signature verification device."13' To use these machines,
banks obtain several signature samples from each authorized check signatory. A
computer analyzes several characteristics of each person's signature. 132 When
the customer's checks are returned to the bank for processing, the device scans
for signatures that do not match the characteristics obtained from the samples.
Detection of the forgery by scanning is less likely if the forgery closely resembles
the authorized signature. 133
The existence of static signature verification equipment presents an attrac-
tive solution to the loss allocation problem. Banks contend that they should not
have to verify signatures because such a slow, labor-intensive, and expensive
process eviscerates the gains made by high-speed check processing technol-
ogy. 134 Computer signature verification offers the possibility that banks will be
able to examine signatures for forgeries far more efficiently. This technology
would result in overall loss reduction because banks would be able to spot for-
geries soon after the wrongdoer begins his or her thefts.' 3 5 Consequently, courts
and legislatures may be tempted to define ordinary care as requiring banks to use
state of the art technology, such as signature verification equipment.
Adopting a state of the art standard of ordinary care, however, creates sev-
eral problems. Unless these machines are relatively inexpensive, smaller or fi-
nancially-strapped banks may be unable to purchase the equipment at a price
that is reasonable in proportion to the size of their overall check processing oper-
ation. Wealthier banks would be advantaged. By proving in court that they
used the equipment, these banks could easily make out a prima facie case of
ordinary care. 136 Banks that could not afford the equipment would have a more
difficult time proving that their practices met the standard. 137
129. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 75.
130. Id.
131. Kutler, supra note 123, at 6, col. 1.
132. Bradshaw, Signature Scanner To Be Launched in US, Financial Times, Sept. 28, 1988, § I,
at 11.
133. Signature Verification System, ABA BANKING J., July 1988, at 85.
134. American Bankers Association Brief as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak
Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783 (1990) (No. 67709). See generally SURVEY,
supra note 94, at 15-16.
135. In most reported cases involving forged signatures, a bookkeeper writes many checks with
forged signatures over a long period of time for small amounts in order to escape detection. See, e.g.,
Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 123, 552 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1990)
(42 forged checks negotiated over six month period, all for less than $1,000); Brief for Appellee at 3-
4, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1890)
(224 forged checks negotiated over four month period, all for $800 or less); Murray, supra note 60, at
711 (average forgery claim of $223 over 41 banks).
136. U.C.C. § 4-103(3). See supra note 99 for the relevant text of this section.
137. But see generally SURVEY, supra note 94, at 16, 112 Table IE (13.9% of banks with assets
under $100 million use service companies to process their checks). These service companies may be
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Another foreseeable problem in equating "ordinary care" with "state of the
art" is the rapidity of technological progress. Assume affordable signature ver-
ification devices are available and virtually every bank buys them. A few years
later more sophisticated machines with significantly greater accuracy are devel-
oped, but are much more expensive. To meet a state of the art ordinary care
standard, would banks have to purchase the new equipment without regard to
cost?
A third problem that arises from equating ordinary care with state of the
art is availability. If a court were to rule that henceforth banks in its jurisdiction
would be subject to a state of the art ordinary care standard, would banks imme-
diately have to purchase the machines? Would sufficient numbers of them be
available shortly after the ruling?
A major concern of banks might be whether employment of the equipment
would slow check processing. Under the Expedited Funds Availability Act,1 38
banks are required to make funds available to customers promptly after they
deposit checks. 139 As a consequence, banks are under tremendous pressure to
process checks speedily to stay within the guidelines set by the statute and the
regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board. 14 The demand for speed is
related to another issue: to comply with a state of the art ordinary care stan-
dard, would banks have to use the device to scan every check, or could they
employ procedures already used by many banks, in which they review the signa-
tures of all checks drawn for a large amount, randomly review checks in an
intermediate range, but don't examine small checks at all? 14 1 If banks could
meet the ordinary care standard by using the verification device to examine only
the relatively small number of checks drawn for large amounts that are sub-
jected to their present procedures, many of their concerns might be satisfied.
This approach would have little effect in detecting forgeries, however, because
most checks with forged signatures are drawn for small amounts. 142
Loss allocation rules that encourage banks to take advantage of technologi-
cal innovations seem both to protect customers and provide banks with an alter-
native to reverting to outmoded human sight review or facing liability. The
development of signature verification machines, however, illustrates that this so-
lution raises possible problems for banks.
3. Responsiveness and Learning
The third and fourth principles of the loss reduction theory are responsive-
ness and learning. The loss reduction principle can be justified only to the extent
that it actually influences the parties' conduct. A loss allocation rule that en-
able to take advantage of economies of scale to purchase advanced technology and charge banks an
affordable fee. Therefore, cost may not, in fact, be a major impediment for the many small banks
that contract with a service company to process the banks' checks.
138. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (Supp. 1 1989).
139. Id. § 4002.
140. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1990).
141. SURVEY, supra note 94, at 119 Table 36E.
142. See generally supra note 135 (most cases involve checks in small amounts).
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courages the taking of precautions and the development and adoption of innova-
tive technology must be designed to ensure that the party who can undertake
these measures at the lowest cost responds to the rule's incentives.' 4 3 Further,
only to the extent that the parties learn of the rules governing loss allocation will
they be responsive to those rules.1 44
Because the UCC does not provide specific guidance on what a bank must
do in regard to signature verification in order to exercise ordinary care as re-
quired by section 4-406(3), it is difficult for both banks and customers to have
adequate knowledge of the rules of loss allocation. Unless courts in the bank's
jurisdiction have decided the issue, reference to case law will provide little assist-
ance, since the courts have taken such a wide variety of positions. 145
If the courts in a bank's jurisdiction have articulated clearly what a bank
must do to exercise ordinary care, knowledge of this standard of conduct may
still vary with the type of party. Banks and large companies employing well-
trained and highly educated financial officers with access to in-house or outside
counsel should have little difficulty understanding and complying with the
bank's duty. Small companies are more likely to be less knowledgeable. Their
financial employees often are bookkeepers; attorneys are consulted on an ad hoc
basis only when a problem arises. Since the current version of the UCC does not
define the bank's duty beyond stating that the bank must exercise ordinary
care, 146 a business would have to hire an attorney to conduct research into the
case law to determine how much risk it was taking in not carefully supervising
the person or persons who prepare the checks and reconcile the statement. Un-
less there was a case decided in the company's jurisdiction, the attorney could do
little more than guess at what the bank's duty might be, given the variety of
stances taken by the courts.
Silence in the UCC, coupled with the lack of clear answers in the case law,
and the lay person's general lack of access to statutory and case law, results in
little knowledge among consumers of the bank's duty in regard to signature ver-
ification under section 4-406(3). Adding to the consumer's ignorance of the law
is the confusion generated by the bank's requirement of a signature affixed to a
signature card accompanied by a deposit agreement that says nothing about the
function of the card. 14 7 Consumers may reasonably assume that the inclusion of
the signature card means the bank engages in some form of signature
verification.
143. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 75.
144. Id. at 76.
145. See infra notes 195-286 and accompanying text for a discussion of the varied approaches
adopted by courts. These approaches include requiring banks to establish a procedure designed to
detect forgeries or requiring only that a bank's procedure is comparable to those of other banks. If
the highest court in the jurisdiction has decided merely that ordinary care is a question for the fact-
finder, the parties' knowledge will remain inadequate.
146. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)-(3). See supra note 9 for the relevant text of these two sections.
147. See supra note 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problem arising from the
fact that most checking account contracts are silent on the matter of the bank's duty to verify
signatures.
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The ability of a party to respond to the UCC's system of loss allocation is
limited by the party's knowledge of that system. Because small businesses and
individual consumers may have limited knowledge, the Code's rules and the in-
terpretation of them by the courts probably have little or no effect on the behav-
ior of these customers. One way to overcome this difficulty is to clarify the
bank's duty by spelling it out in the Code. Banks could be required to inform
customers of their responsibilities and of the customers' need to take precautions
to avoid liability. Customers may not understand the message of the disclosure,
however, unless it is given in a conspicuous fashion and in plain English. 148
Even then, consumers in particular may not respond to this notice because of
"information overload." 1 4 9 Without disclosure, however, it is unreasonable to
expect consumers to acquire information about the Code's rules.
Even if a party has the requisite knowledge, he or she may not respond by
taking precautions or adopting innovative technology. Whether banks respond
to a court's definition of ordinary care, which requires the bank to adopt a rigor-
ous procedure of signature verification, depends upon whether the bank predicts
the cost of taking precautions such as sight review or buying state of the art
equipment is greater than the loss it would suffer if it were found liable. The
bank's ability to spread losses to others should be part of the calculation as well.
Even if courts define ordinary care to mean that a bank can behave however
it wants, as long as its conduct conforms to that of other banks,1 50 and custom-
ers are aware of these rulings, if customers fail to report forged signatures
promptly, it will be nearly impossible to shift liability back to the bank under
section 4-406(3). Customers' responsiveness to this loss allocation rule likely
will vary. Larger companies might respond by having different persons prepare
checks and reconcile the statement. Companies required to file reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission should adopt procedures such as this at
any rate to be in compliance with the Exchange Act. 1 51 Smaller companies may
not respond, however, because the cost may be too high, 152 and they may pre-
dict their risk is low. Individual consumers may not respond to a loss allocation
rule that puts a premium on their ability to reconcile bank statements because of
deficiencies in math or language skills. 1 53 In light of the time and effort required
to acquire those skills and an individual's calculation of the risk, he or she may
not believe it is worthwhile to respond. Consumers faced with statements lit-
tered with data related to noncheck transactions and those whose checks are
148. See generally Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook- An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 850-56
(1977) (lack of readability, coupled with conceptual difficulty, impact negatively on consumer
comprehension).
149. Id. at 847-50.
150. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of conduct deemed to be
consistent with general banking usage and the exercise of ordinary care.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1988).
152. See infra note 182 and accompanying text for a discussion of how small companies, in-
cluding nonprofit institutions, depend upon volunteers to handle accounting procedures.
153. See supra note 117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the increasing complexity of
modern bank statements.
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truncated may also decide it is not worth their time to be responsive to legal
rules on loss allocation 15 4
The loss reduction principle seeks to assign liability in a way that encour-
ages conduct designed to minimize economic injury. Achieving this worthy goal,
however, is elusive because application of the principle does not place the loss
consistently on either the customer or the bank. The party to bear the loss is
dependent upon whether the focus is on taking precautions, on adopting innova-
tive technology, on obtaining knowledge of the law or on being responsive to the
rules of loss allocation. Individual characteristics of the bank and the customer
should also effect who bears the loss.
C The Loss Imposition Principle
The objective of the loss imposition principle is to make enforcement of the
liability assigned by the law as efficient as possible. ' 55 Efficiency can be achieved
by fashioning rules that allow the party suffering the loss to bring a lawsuit at a
cost that is low enough to make litigation feasible. The first way to achieve this
result is to establish rules that prevent the filing of lawsuits the plaintiff is likely
to lose. Second, plaintiffs filing meritorious lawsuits need rules to resolve issues
as simply and quickly as possible. Otherwise, unless the loss is very large, the
cost of litigation and the risk of not obtaining a judgment or favorable settlement
make it irrational to sue. The type of rules that achieve these objectives are
those that are "simple, clear and decisive." 156 Examples of such rules are:
"strict liability rather than fault-based liability, single factor standards rather
than multiple factor standards, [and] objective rather than* subjective
tests. .... '157
The UCC scheme for allocating loss due to forged signatures generally con-
forms to this model. The bank is strictly liable for paying a check bearing a
forged signature. 15 8 Aper se negligence standard attaches to customers who fail
to report checks with unauthorized signatures soon after they receive their bank
statement. 159 The duty of ordinary care imposed on banks pursuant to section
4-406(3), however, violates the loss imposition principle. Although the UCC
allocates the loss to the bank if the bank fails to exercise ordinary care, the loss
initially is always on the customer because the bank has paid the check and
charged the customer's account. A lawsuit is therefore required to put the ulti-
mate loss on the party whom the Code designates as the appropriate one to bear
it, unless the bank agrees to recredit the customer's account. Not only is the
burden on the customer to file a lawsuit, but the burden is also on the customer
154. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning and ramifi-
cations of the truncated account.
155. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 78.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 11 and accompanying text stating that the UCC allows the bank to pay
only checks that are properly payable.
159. U.C.C. § 4-406(1)-(2). See supra note 9 for the relevant text of these two sections.
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to establish the bank's lack of ordinary care. 160 The customer appears to be the
logical party to have this burden because ordinarily it will be the plaintiff in the
lawsuit.
The scheme described above, though rational, is contrary to the objectives
of the loss imposition principle. The ordinary care standard, unlike strict liabil-
ity, is based on fault. It is not a "simple, clear and decisive" standard since it
requires a fact-intensive inquiry. Not only is the burden on the customer, but
that burden is to prove something that is within the exclusive knowledge of the
bank. When a bank pays checks containing forged signatures and the customer
fails to report promptly, the customer has no way to know whether it can bring a
successful lawsuit against the bank under section 4-406(3). Unless the bank vol-
untarily discloses its signature verification procedures, the customer is forced to
file a lawsuit and engage in discovery to learn the bank's practices. 16' It is only
after the customer has this information that it can evaluate the merits of its
lawsuit. Thus, the UCC's scheme does not prevent the plaintiff from filing law-
suits it is likely to lose.
Furthermore, the UCC's scheme does not lend itself to simple and quick
resolution of the issues. In addition to the need to engage in discovery, the cus-
tomer probably will need expert testimony. Under section 4-103(3), "action or
non-action consistent with general banking usage... prima facie constitutes the
exercise of ordinary care."' 62 Once the bank offers proof that its signature ver-
ification practices are similar to those of other banks,1 63 the customer must
prove either that the bank's practices are not similar to those of other banks, or
that the practices of the banks are "unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair."' 64 It is
difficult to imagine customers overcoming the bank's prima facie case without
expert testimony, unless a court is willing to rule that a bank's practice consti-
tutes a lack of ordinary care as a matter of law, an issue on which the courts are
divided. 165
Because the UCC requires customers to engage in expensive litigation to
shift the loss to the bank, rational customers will not litigate these cases unless a
substantial amount of money is at stake.' 66 The practical effect of the UCC
160. U.C.C. § 4-406(3). See supra note 9 for the relevant text of this section.
161. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at A-12, Medford Irrigation Dist. v.
Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. A-26603) (alternative methods of review-
ing drawer's signature must meet standard of ordinary care).
162. U.C.C. § 4-103(3).
163. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 347,
546 N.E.2d 904, 907, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614 (1989) (section 4-103(3) does not specify who has
burden of proving general banking usage; at least one court has held this burden is on bank).
164. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4. See also McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772
S.W.2d 183, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (burden of proof on depositor when credit union shows com-
pliance with industry standards) (citing Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848
F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988)).
165. Compare McDowell, 772 S.W.2d at 191 (court held bank failed to exercise ordinary care as
matter of law) with Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 131, 552
N.E.2d 783, 787 (1990) (court declined to rule that bank failed to exercise ordinary care as matter of
law).
166. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 79-80; Dow & Ellis, The Proposed Uniform New Pay-
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scheme is that, regardless of the explicit rules on loss allocation, the loss remains
on the customer unless the total amount of the loss exceeds the transaction costs
of litigation by a sum large enough to make it worth the cost, time, and effort
required to litigate. This means individual consumers will bear the loss in al-
most all cases,1 67 and business customers will bear the loss in all cases in which
the wrongdoer, through fear or discretion, has kept the amount of theft small
enough to make it infeasible for the customer to sue the bank. While this will be
a manageable loss to bear for some businesses, it may be an onerous burden for
many other small businesses.
Although the UCC's use of an ordinary care standard violates the loss im-
position principle, it remedies one of its disadvantages. While a rule of strict
liability would be consistent with the loss imposition principle and would result
in greater certainty and less costly litigation, it also would remove the element of
flexibility. 168 Flexibility enables the courts to apply legal standards to changing
commercial practices in a reasonable fashion. 169 The Code's nebulous ordinary
care standard permits flexibility. In addition, the ordinary care standard is con-
sistent with the precaution element of the loss reduction principle.l70 Assigning
liability to provide incentives for parties to take precautions typically involves
considering who is regarded as being at fault.171
While it may be reasonable to impose upon business customers a loss allo-
cation scheme that precludes many lawsuits even though the bank failed to exer-
cise ordinary care, the scheme has an unreasonable impact upon individual
consumers, who will be precluded in almost all cases from bringing a claim.
Consequently, special consumer legislation may be warranted. Cooter and
Rubin propose a statute that would encourage both banks and consumers to
take precautions, and would make it attractive for banks to adopt innovative
technology, by apportioning liability. 172 In addition, this legislation could make
litigation feasible by providing for an award of attorney's fees and minimum
statutory damages.173
Consideration of the economic principles proposed by Cooter and Rubin
does not provide a clear resolution to the questions raised by section 4-406(3).
Applying these principles to that section, however, does lead to a better under-
standing of its operation. In addition, these principles provide insights for an
ments Code: Allocation of Losses Resulting From Forged Drawers' Signatures, 22 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 399, 415 (1985). In one case, the jury found it cost the customer $26,700 in reasonable attor-
ney fees to get through the trial stage of the case, would cost an additional $15,000 for an appeal to
the intermediate court of appeals, and $10,000 for an appeal to the state's highest court. McDowell,
772 S.W.2d at 187.
167. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 79 n.70, 85; Dow & Ellis, supra note 166, at 415.
168. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 79.
169. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2)(b), 4-103 comment 1.
170. See supra notes 108-28 for a discussion of the application of the precaution element of the
loss reduction principle.
171. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 85.
172. Id. at 90.
173. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1990) (Truth in Lending Act provides for attorney's fees
and statutory minimum damages).
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examination of the case law under section 4-406(3) and the proposed revision of
that section, and guidance for a proposal to improve that revision.
III. SIGHT REVIEW v. BLIND BULK PROCESSING: THE CASE LAW
The five principal cases concerning forged signatures decided in the 1980s
have little uniformity or consistency of analysis, even among decisions holding
for the same party. This is a natural outgrowth of the failure of the UCC to
provide one set of consistent goals and objectives and a framework of analysis.
Application of the Code should yield uniform and sound results, but also should
allow flexibile response to accommodate varying fact situations.
A. Fact Scenarios - Variability Contributes to a Confusing Body of Law
One reason the forged-check case law of the 1980s lacks consistency is be-
cause each court has addressed different bank procedures. At the two extremes,
one bank conducted sight review of all checks 17 4 while another was fully auto-
mated, reviewing no checks for forged signatures. 175 Other banks were partially
automated; checks over a certain amount were subject to sight review, the rest
were not.176 Some banks even had a variation on this procedure, subjecting
those checks over a certain amount to sight review, excluding checks in small
amounts from any review, but conducting a random review of all checks in an
intermediate range. 177 Some banks did not do any check processing themselves;
it was contracted out to service providers.' 78 Some banks sent no cancelled
checks to customers; checks were truncated and stored by a third party so even
the customer's bank did not have direct access to the cancelled checks. 179
The five cases analyzed below are uniform in that all involve commercial
customers and in each case the wrongdoer was an employee who forged an au-
thorized signature. All five cases involved employees who forged in small
amounts over several months until the aggregate forgery involved large sums.' 80
While the customers obviously failed to supervise their bookkeepers ade-
quately, 8 1 it would be wrong to assume that all customers are equally culpable.
174. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 344,
546 N.E.2d 904, 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1989).
175. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989).
176. See, e.g., Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 11. 2d 121, 127, 552
N.E.2d 783, 785 (1990) (automatic sorting and payment of checks less than $1000 and manual
signature verification on those greater than $1000).
177. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st
Cir. 1988) (bank examined all checks over $1000, checks from $100-41000 if problems suspected,
and random 1% of checks from $100-51000).
178. See, e.g., McDowell, 772 S.W.2d at 186 (check processing undertaken by third party).
179. Id.
180. In Zapata, almost all of the checks were in amounts of $150 to $800. Zapata Corp., 848
F.2d at 292. The wrongdoer in Putnam continued her forgeries for approximately 10 months. Put-
nam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 343, 546 N.E.2d 904,
905, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1989).
181. J. WILLINGHAM & D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 110, at 216-17. The American Institute
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Cases have involved small nonprofit institutions depending on volunteers to do
the bookkeeping, 182 or employees who were honest for many years.' 8 3 In one
case, the wrongdoing occurred while management was involved in a major reor-
ganization and was changing over to a new computer system. 84
Another factor that influenced the decisions was the procedural posture of
the case. One case was decided on a motion for summary judgment. 185 One
case went to a jury.186 Further, evidence establishing general bank usage varied
greatly. In one case the bank put on expert witnesses to present evidence of
general banking usage. 187 In a case that was decided on a motion for summary
judgment, the bank merely presented an affidavit of one of its own officers assert-
ing its views on general usage.18 8 In one case that went to trial the bank
presented no evidence whatsoever on this usage. 189 In no case did the customer
present evidence of general bank usage.
This disparity in facts allowed the parties in some cases to make successful
arguments that would not apply in other cases. For example, since a credit
union in one case reviewed no checks, 19 0 the customer was able to argue that the
credit union could not be exercising ordinary care, because it was exercising no
care. 191 This should be contrasted with those cases in which banks review only
checks over a certain amount. Customers there have argued that the bank exer-
cised no care because the bank did not review checks in the amount of those
forged. 19 2 This argument raises the issue of whether the court should use as its
frame of reference the bank's overall procedure for reviewing checks, or whether
the court should instead focus on the bank's procedure for reviewing the checks
in the amount of the particular check involved.
The lack of trials at which both sides used expert witnesses to develop the
of Certified Public Accountants' Committee on Auditing Procedure has suggested that a satisfactory
organizational structure segregates duties so no one person handles all stages of a transaction. The
cost of such an internal control should not exceed the expected benefits. CODIFICATION OF STATE-
MENTS, supra note 113, at 65.
182. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109 (1966), overruled, Vend-
ing Chattanooga Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. 1987).
183. K & K Mfg. v. Union Bank, 129 Ariz. 7, 10-11, 628 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1981) (misplaced
confidence in employee will not excuse duty of depositor).
184. Appellants' Brief at 2, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d
291 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1890).
185. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ii. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783
(1990).
186. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). The
jury found the bank exercised ordinary care. Id. at 187.
187. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294.
188. Wilder Binding Co., 135 Ill. 2d at 127, 552 N.E.2d at 785.
189. See, e.g., Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d
340, 546 N.E.2d 904, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1989).
190. See, e.g., McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989).
191. Appellant's Brief at 16, McDowell (No. 05-88-00652).
192. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 24, Wilder Binding Co. (No. 67709); Appellants' Brief at 11,
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1890).
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issue of general banking usage has left many questions unanswered. UCC Sec-
tion 4-103 comment 4 provides:
The term 'general banking usage' is not defined but should be taken to
mean a general usage common to banks in the area concerned... the
intention is to require a usage broader than a mere practice between
two or three banks but it is not intended to require anything as broad
as a country-wide usage. A usage followed generally throughout a
state .. . a metropolitan area or the like would certainly be
sufficient. 193
The comment was written at a time when only commercial banks provided regu-
lar checking services. Today thrifts offer NOW accounts and credit unions offer
share drafts. This creates issues such as whether a credit union can meet its
burden under section 4-103 by proving its practice is consistent with those of
other credit unions rather than banks. In the alternative, and more in keeping
with the geographical focus of the comment, perhaps the credit union must
show its practices are consistent not only with those of other credit unions in its
community, but also with those of thrifts and commercial banks in that area.' 94
B. Legal Analysis - Whether To Focus On the Customer or Other Banks and
"Efficiency'"
The decisions rendered in the five principal forged:signature cases of the
last ten years provide little guidance for banks and customers. The crucial dif-
ference between outcomes favoring customers and those favoring banks is
whether the court focused on the reasonableness of the banks' practices from the
perspective of the relationship between the customer and the bank, or compared
the banks' internal operations to those of other banks. Another major factor in
determining the outcome of these cases is the analytical framework employed by
the courts.
In McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 195 the court held that under
the UCC, the bank (which in this case was a credit union) is "conclusively pre-
sumed to know the signature of [its] depositor;"' 96 therefore, the bank has a
"duty to signature-verify.' 1 97 To fulfill that duty, the bank must establish some
"process" to verify signatures.' 9 8 Although the bank made out a prima facie
case of ordinary care by showing its practice (no procedure whatsoever) was
common among credit unions, the court found, as a matter of law, that this
absence of procedure was "unreasonable, arbitrary, and unfair."' 99 The bank
193. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4.
194. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems associated
with assessing ordinary care where financial institutions, such as credit unions, truncate their checks.
Arguably, different rules should apply in that situation since customers are not sent their cancelled
checks with their bank statements.
195. 772 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
196. Id. at 188.
197. Id. at 191.
198. Id. at 189.
199. Id. The requirement of showing that the bank's practice is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unfair is contained not in the Code itself, but in a comment. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4. The
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apparently had demonstrated that its policy of not verifying signatures was effi-
cient.2° ° But rather than discussing the role a cost-benefit analysis might take in
this type of case, the court summarily dismissed the evidence, stating that the
adoption of an efficient operation cannot authorize a bank to "set its own uncon-
trolled standard." 20 1 Not only did the court decline to provide any guidance
beyond requiring that banks employ some procedure, but it specifically declared
that its holding should not be interpreted to give approval or disapproval to any
particular procedure. 20 2
Whereas in McDowell the bank adopted the most automated techniques,
examined no signatures, and introduced evidence that this was consistent with
industry practices, the bank in Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co.20 3 still employed manual sight review of every check, and
presented no evidence of general banking usage. It would seem logical that a
bank would easily meet the standard of ordinary care when it examines the sig-
nature of each check. The court in Putnam, however, apparently agreed with
the trier of fact who found that "allowing at most four seconds to inspect each
check" 204 was a procedure "so superficial as to offer no realistic opportunity to
detect forged checks."' 20 5 In addition, the bank's failure to show that its proce-
dures were followed by other banks may have influenced the court's decision
that the bank was negligent. The court's fundamental approach may have been
determinative, however. The court noted that the loss allocation scheme prior
to enactment of the UCC was based on the theory that the bank-customer rela-
tionship was defined by the contract between the parties. 2°6 The court further
believed that the UCC approach was in "accord" with that theory. 20 7 This in-
terpretation of the meaning of ordinary care is consistent with a focus on the
customer as a creditor to whom the bank owes contractual duties. The Putnam
court also seized upon the statement in a Code comment that ordinary care is
used "with its normal tort meaning and not in any special sense relating to bank
collections. ' 20 8 However, the court failed to acknowledge that this declaration
of tort law is problematic because ordinary care in the normal tort case is always
defined by the context in which the conduct took place2° 9 and is inconsistent
with the next paragraph of the same comment and the Code provision tying
McDowell court was also impressed by the fact that the bank processed and paid checks that con-
tained no signatures. McDowell, 722 S.W.2d at 189.
200. McDowell, 722 S.W.2d at 191.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 191 n.5.
203. 74 N.Y.2d 340, 546 N.E.2d 904, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1989).
204. Id. at 344, 546 N.E.2d at 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
205. Id. at 346, 546 N.E.2d at 906-07, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
206. Id. at 345, 546 N.E.2d at 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 613. See also supra notes 15-16 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the proposition that the customer's deposit creates the debtor-credi-
tor relationship.
207. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 345, 546 N.E.2d at 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
208. See U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4.
209. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposition that con-
duct is negligent if it is unreasonable under the circumstances.
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ordinary care to general banking usage.2 10 Instead, the court interpreted the
reference to the "normal tort meaning" as inviting the customer to show its
"bank lacked ordinary care by presenting any type of proof that the bank failed
to act reasonably."'2 1I Besides giving customers a relatively free rein to show the
bank's negligence, the court also believed that this tort was to be considered
within the broader context of the UCC, which has objectives fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of tort law. 2 12 Consequently, the court of appeals in Putnam
held that the trial court erred in pursuing the tort theory beyond the explicit
provisions of the Code and in applying a comparative negligence principle. 2 13
Putnam provides little guidance for customers and banks. The trier of fact
decided that inspecting checks for no longer than four seconds was not ordinary
care.2 14 Perhaps that trier of fact would have found ten seconds adequate; possi-
bly a different trier of fact would have found as little as two seconds satisfied the
standard. Putnam represents a warning that even sight review of every check
may not pass muster. It shows how a court can use the "normal tort meaning"
language in the comment as a powerful tool.
It is unclear, however, how the Putnam case would have been decided if the
bank had presented evidence of general banking practice. The court declared
that one of the Code's objectives is "efficiency in dispute resolution. '2 15 By
making ordinary care a matter of fact rather than law and establishing no stan-
dards, the court promoted an inefficient system of dispute resolution in violation
of the loss imposition principle. 2 16 After Putnam, customers contemplating law-
suits in New York will have difficulty gauging their chance of success, and banks
will have difficulty determining what types of cases justify prompt settlement.
The signature review procedure employed by the bank in Medford Irriga-
tion District v. Western Bank 217 was mid-way between the two extremes of Put-
nam (every check examined) and McDowell (no checks reviewed). The bank in
Medford reviewed the signatures of checks in the amount of $5,000 and over.
Those under $5,000 were processed by computer. 2 18  The court rejected the
bank's cost-benefit argument 219 and held that "as a matter of law" the bank
failed to exercise ordinary care.220 Consistent with its view that ordinary care
210. U.C.C. § 4-103(3); § 4-103(3) comment 4.
211. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 346, 546 N.E.2d at 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
The court found proper the admission of evidence that the bank also paid checks containing one
instead of the required two signatures, since this showed the bank operated its check processing
system in an unsafe condition. Id. at 346, 546 N.E.2d at 907, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
212. Id. at 349, 546 N.E.2d at 908, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 615. The Putnam court stated: "Unlike
tort law, the UCC has the objective of promoting certainty and predictability in commercial transac-
tions." Id. Liability is based on who is best able to prevent loss rather than on fault. Id.
213. Id., 546 N.E.2d at 908, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
214. Id. at 346, 546 N.E.2d at 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
215. Id. at 349, 546 N.E.2d at 908, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
216. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument that effi-
cient adjudication requires clear rules that resolve disputes quickly and simply.
217. 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984).
218. Id. at 592, 676 P.2d at 331.
219. Id., 676 P.2d at 332.
220. Id. at 594, 676 P.2d at 333.
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and commercially reasonable procedures amount to the same standard,2 2 1 the
court also held that the bank's procedures were not reasonable commercial
practices. 222
The Medford court's analysis focused on the contractual relationship be-
tween the bank and its customer rather than on the bank's practices vis-a-vis
other banks.223 The decision assumed there was a contract (albeit implied), and
that this contract obligated the bank to pay only those checks containing author-
ized signatures. 2 24 The court also cited a state court of appeals dissent that
attacked the majority opinion "for proceeding on negligence principles when the
relationship between the bank and its depositor is one of contract, ' 225 and
quoted from a commentator who asserts that the strict liability scheme of loss
allocation is "'born of an implied contract between bank and depositor.' "226
The importance of the contractual focus is illustrated by the court's treat-
ment of general banking usage. In Medford, the bank argued that its procedures
were similar to those of other banks. 2 2 7 Neither party, however, cited UCC
section 4-103(3) in its brief.2 28 The court nevertheless seemed to concede that
the bank's procedure was in conformity with industry standards. That alone
could not save the procedure from successful attack, however, because the "rea-
sonableness of commercial banking standards must be analyzed in the context of
a bank's duty in relation to the depositor's account" and the implied contract
between the parties, not solely in comparison with the practices of other
banks.
2 2 9
221. Id. at 593, 676 P.2d at 332.
222. Id. at 594, 676 P.2d at 333.
223. The legal underpinning of the McDowell case, by contrast, was the duty imposed by the
UCC to verify signatures. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d at 186, 188, 191
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989). The Putnam case also focused on the Code-imposed duty, noting that this was
consistent with pre-Code "theory" that there was a contractual relationship between the customer
and the bank. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340,
345, 546 N.E.2d 904, 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (1989). The McDowell opinion's silence about the
contractual relationship makes one wonder whether the court thought there was none, or that such
relationship was irrelevant. The Putnam court speaks of the contract as something that was relevant
in the past; it is unclear whether the court believed it still played a role.
224. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 592, 676 P.2d at 332. In its brief, the customer
pointed out that its action was based on the bank's breach of contractual duty, not on negligence or
conversion. Respondent's Brief and Supplemental Abstract of Record at 36, Medford Irrigation
DisL (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
225. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 595, 676 P.2d at 333 (citing dissent in American
Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. Isaac, 636 P.2d 1296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981), affid, 675 P.2d 742 (Colo.
1984)).
226. Id. at 595-96, 676 P.2d at 334 (quoting B. CLARKE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS (Supp.
1982)).
227. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 26, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1;
A-26603).
228. See, eg., Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record, Table of Citations at vi, Medford
Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603); Appellant's Reply Brief, Table of Citations at iii, Med-
ford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603); Respondent's Brief, Index of Authorities at v,
Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
229. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 592, 676 P.2d at 332.
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The Medford court also rejected the bank's cost-benefit argument. In its
brief, the bank had presented the results of a study it conducted comparing for-
gery losses incurred under sight review to those incurred after converting to
computer processing. 230 The bank interpreted the data as showing that "there
had been no significant increase or decrease in forgery losses" as a result of
conversion to computer processing.231 The bank explained the results by assert-
ing that most forgeries are so well done that it is impossible to identify them.
232
Moreover, the bank estimated it was saving $142,000 by converting from sight
review to computer processing.2 33 Based on this data, the bank contended that a
standard of ordinary care that required sight review would cost the bank money
and would be passed on to customers in increased service charges, but would
result in no greater protection. 234 Those higher service charges would require
customers who are careful in reviewing their statements and cancelled checks to
"subsidize" the cost for implementing sight review in order to benefit customers
who are negligent. 235 In addition to being less costly, the computerized proce-
dure allowed the bank to prepare and distribute statements more promptly.
236
The court in Medford did not dispute the bank's contentions that computer
processing is efficient, less costly, a "prudent business decision," and the proce-
dure adopted by most banks.237 Nevertheless, it rejected the bank's analysis.
First, the court emphasized that it was not requiring banks to engage in sight
review to meet the ordinary care and commercial reasonableness standard.
238
Rather, the bank can adopt any procedure it wishes, as long as it reasonably
relates to the detection of unauthorized signatures. 239 Second, according to the
court, the Code imposes certain responsibilities upon banks, and banks cannot
necessarily meet those responsibilities simply by showing that their procedures
are efficient. 24° In other words, efficiency may not necessarily lead to findings of
commercial reasonableness and non-negligence. This derogation of efficiency is
consistent with the court's contractual focus. It is in sharp contrast to the analy-
sis urged by the bank, which requested the court to focus on two other factors to
determine ordinary care. According to the bank, a procedure that was efficient,
and comparable to those of other banks, was non-negligent.24 1 Consequently, it
230. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 10, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1;
A-26603). This information was available to the trial court in the form of depositions and affidavits.
Id.
231. Id. It is not clear how the bank made its calculations. For the period covering the checks
involved in Medford, the bank reported forgery losses totalling $12,616.44. Id. The bank admitted,
however, that the losses from the Medford forgeries alone amounted to $68,751.56. Id. at 7.
232. Id. at 11.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 4.
236. Id. at 11.
237. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 593, 676 P.2d at 332.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 227-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bank's arguments
concerning efficiency and trade practice.
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fulfilled the bank's responsibilities to the customer. The court rejected this ap-
proach because it would permit the bank to shift the loss to the customer, while
employing a procedure that does not reasonably relate to forgery detection.
As discussed below, the Medford court had a sound basis for dismissing the
bank's cost-benefit argument.242 The bank, however, is left with no guidance
from the court as to the procedure that might satisfy the court. The procedure
used by the bank in Medford was found lacking even though it was superior to
that used in McDowell, and despite the court's statement that sight review of
every check is not required. 24 3 Presumably, the court would approve a proce-
dure more stringent than that used by the bank in Medford, even though it was
not as thorough as sight review of all checks. Banks cannot be certain what
procedure within that range might be acceptable, especially since even sight re-
view of all checks may fail to constitute ordinary care under certain
circumstances. 244
The case of Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank 24 5
presented an opportunity for clarification of the ordinary care standard, but both
the appellate court of Illinois and the Illinois Supreme Court failed to provide
guidance to customers and banks. The Medford court had found that a proce-
dure of reviewing checks in the amount of $5,000 or more did not constitute the
exercise of ordinary care. The bank in Wilder had a procedure designed to de-
tect many more forgeries. It reviewed all checks in the amount of $1,000 or
more.246 Unfortunately, each of the forty-two checks containing forged signa-
tures was made out for less than $1,000.
The Illinois Appellate Court in Wilder, purporting to follow Medford and
other cases, 247 held that the bank's procedures demonstrated a failure to exercise
ordinary care as a matter or law, because "forgery-detection procedures are non-
existent." 248 It therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of the customer's mo-
tion for summary judgment. In order to provide ordinary care, the court would
require the bank to establish a procedure designed to detect forgeries on checks
under as well as over $1,000.249 The court apparently believed the bank could
satisfy this requirement by employing either sight review or random review.
250
The judges dismissed the bank's contention that its procedure conformed to gen-
eral banking usage, arguing that such conformity cannot "magically insulate"
242. See infra notes 291-329 and accompanying text for a discussion of the numerous grounds
upon which cost-benefit analysis can be attacked.
243. Medford Irrigation Dist, 66 Or. App. at 593, 676 P.2d at 332.
244. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 346,
546 N.E.2d 904, 906-07, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613-14 (1989).
245. 135 11. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783 (1990).
246. Id. at 124, 552 N.E.2d at 785.
247. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 173 Ill. App. 3d 34, 41, 527 N.E.2d
354, 358 (1988), rev'd, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783 (1990).
248. Id. at 42, 527 N.E.2d at 359.
249. Id. at 40-41, 527 N.E.2d at 358.
250. Id. at 42, 527 N.E.2d at 358-59 (as cost of doing business, banks may examine each draft
against signature, use some form of random check, or use automatic sorters, absorbing expense of
occasional forgeries).
1990]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
banks; they must have a procedure that will detect forgeries, regardless of what
other banks are doing. 25 1 Finally, the court rejected the bank's cost-benefit ar-
gument, asserting that banks adopting an automated system that cannot detect
forgeries should incur liability as a "cost of doing business." 25 2
The Wilder court's holding was grounded on its conclusion that the UCC
imposes on the bank "an absolute duty not to pay unauthorized drafts, '25 3 and
the resulting requirement that the bank employ a procedure involving some
form of signature review of all checks. In contrast, the dissent stressed the tort
concept of section 4-103 and its comment which was "virtually ignored by the
majority."' 254 Dissenting Judge Jiganti criticized what he regarded as the major-
ity's failure to take into consideration the efficiencies effectuated by computers, a
consideration that was appropriate given the Code's intention to be flexible
enough to accommodate new technology, and given the tort concept the Code
uses to weigh bank conduct. 255
The bank appealed and was supported by briefs filed on behalf of the Amer-
ican Bankers Association, the Illinois Bankers Association, and the Chicago
Clearinghouse Association. 2 56 The participation of these organizations demon-
strates the importance of the issue. The Illinois Public Action Council sup-
ported the customer.2 57 The briefs presented the Wilder court with the wide
variety of analytical approaches, contentions, and policy choices that previous
courts had considered. The Illinois Bankers Association decried the "devastat-
ing impact [of the lower court decision and cases such as Medford] upon the
efficient operation of our banking system." 258 The Chicago Clearinghouse urged
the Illinois Supreme Court to engage in a cost-benefit analysis. 2 5 9 The Ameri-
can Bankers Association described the increased volume of checks banks con-
fronted, and the technological innovations developed to handle that volume. 26 0
According to the American Bankers Association, the Code drafters specifically
"anticipated and accommodated" these developments "by incorporating such
flexible concepts as 'ordinary care' into the Code."' 26 1 The brief filed by the
bank contended, inter alia, that tort concepts controlled 262 and that, conse-
251. Id. at 41, 527 N.E.2d at 358.
252. Id. at 42, 527 N.E.2d at 358.
253. Id. at 41, 527 N.E.2d at 358.
254. Id. at 44, 527 N.E.2d at 360 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 45, 527 N.E.2d at 360-61 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
256. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 124, 552 N.E.2d 783,
784 (1990).
257. Id.
258. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Illinois Bankers Association, on Behalf of Defendant-Appel-
lant, Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank, an Illinois Banking Corporation at 6-7, Wilder Binding Co.
(No. 67709).
259. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Chicago Clearing House Association, in Support of the Appeal of
Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank at 7-9, Wilder Binding Co. (No. 67709).
260. Motion for Leave to File a Brief and Brief of The American Bankers Association as Ami-
cus Curiae at 5-10, Wilder Binding Co. (No. 67709).
261. Id. at 7.
262. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank at 37-41, Wilder Binding
Co. (No. 67709).
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quently, the lower court erred in deciding the case as a matter of law since "neg-
ligence is a question of fact."' 263 The bank also denied that it had no procedures
designed to detect forgeries on checks under $1,000. It claimed its practice of
mailing statements to customers constituted "one of the most effective means of
detecting an ongoing pattern of forgery by the same wrongdoer. ' ' 264 The cus-
tomer relied on Medford and on cases holding that the bank is required to know
its customer's signature as support for its position. 265 The brief of the Illinois
Public Action Council attacked the argument that banks can fulfill their ordi-
nary care obligations by relying on the customer to conduct its own sight re-
view. 266 It charged that the cost-benefit analysis urged by the bank and its allies
improperly weighed the risk to the customer against a benefit to the bank.267
The lower court opinion, coupled with the briefs filed with the court, set out
for the Illinois Supreme Court in Wilder the full array of issues, questions, poli-
cies, and possibilities. Based on this information, the supreme court had the
opportunity to articulate an analytical framework that would provide the gui-
dance lacking in other decisions. Instead, the Wilder court decided the case on
very narrow grounds, reversing the trial court, which had granted summary
judgment in favor of the customer.268 The supreme court held that the require-
ments for summary judgment were not met because "a genuine issue of material
fact exists regarding whether defendant exercised ordinary care."'269 The trier of
fact should determine whether the bank's procedure "is 'consistent with general
banking usage' and, accordingly, 'prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary
care.' "270 The court, therefore, rejected the lower court's holding that a bank
which has no procedure to review checks under $1,000 fails to exercise ordinary
care as a matter of law.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Wilder also left several other questions unan-
swered. For example, is it the province of the trier of fact to decide whether a
bank's "procedure" can consist of relying on its customers to conduct sight re-
view of ninety-three percent of all of the bank's checks?27' If that is proper,
then is ordinary care solely a question for the trier of fact if the bank's procedure
is to review no checks and to rely on the customer to sight review 100% of the
checks, as in McDowell? Is it still solely a question of fact when, as in McDowell,
not only does the bank review no checks, but the customer receives no checks
263. Id. at 38.
264. Id. at 61.
-265. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Wilder Binding Company at 11-26, Wilder Binding Co. (No.
67709).
266. Brief and Argument of Amicus Curiae, Illinois Public Action Council at 12, Wilder Bind-
ing Co. (No. 67709).
267. Id. at 8.
268. The Illinois trial court decision in Wilder had been affirmed by the Illinois Appellate
Court in Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 173 Ill. App. 3d 34, 527 N.E.2d
354 (1988), before reversal by the Illinois Supreme Court.
269. Wilder Binding Co., 135 Ill. 2d at 131, 552 N.E.2d at 787.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 136, 552 N.E.2d at 789 (Calvo, J., dissenting) (only seven percent of checks in
Wilder subject to sight review by bank).
1990]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
with its statement because they are truncated? Is the court holding that ordi-
nary care is always a question of fact regardless of the bank's procedure?
The Illinois Supreme Court in Wilder similarly provides no guidance on the
question of establishing aprimafacie case of ordinary care. The applicable UCC
comment states that to qualify as a "general" banking usage, "[a] usage followed
generally throughout . . . a metropolitan area . . . would certainly be suffi-
cient."'272 Can the bank meet this test by presenting testimony of the bank's
officers that "more than two or three banks in the metropolitan Chicago area...
automatically pay checks drawn for less than a designated amount without man-
ually verifying the signatures on those checks? ' 273 Is the practice of two or
three banks representative of the nature of practice throughout Chicago? Does
the bank have to show those two or three banks are comparable to the defendant
bank in size and type of financial institution? Is general banking usage estab-
lished by showing other banks automatically pay checks for less than some un-
specified amount, as the bank's affidavit in Wilder stated, or does the bank have
to show the other banks use a cut-off point comparable to the defendant bank's
in terms of dollar amount or percentage of checks not subject to any review?
Can the bank make its prima facie case through the testimony of its own em-
ployees, or must it present evidence from an independent source? Upon whom
is the burden placed to show whether the bank's practice conforms to bank
usage?2
74
Furthermore, in remanding the case, the Illinois Supreme Court in Wilder
said the trial court should allow the trier of fact to determine whether the bank
had presented a prima facie case by showing its procedure was consistent with
general banking usage.27 5 The majority, unmoved by the dissents' apparent con-
cern, seemed to accept that a mere showing that other banks engage in similar
practices might be sufficient to avoid liability, even if these practices fall below
the ordinary care standard. 276 The court failed to address the question of what
the customer must show in order to overcome the prima facie case. The Code is
also silent on this matter.2 77
Another issue that the Illinois Supreme Court in Wilder avoided was the
role of cost-benefit analysis. The First Circuit confronted that issue head-on in
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp. 278 The bank in
Zapata employed the random signature detection procedure for smaller checks
272. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4.
273. Wilder Binding Co., 135 Ill. 2d at 129, 552 N.E.2d at 786.
274. See Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340,
347-48, 546 N.E.2d 904, 907-08, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614-15 (1989) (burden of showing bank's prac-
tice conforms to banking standard discussed).
275. Wilder Binding Co., 135 I1. 2d at 131, 552 N.E.2d at 787.
276. Id. at 134, 552 N.E.2d at 788 (Calvo, J., dissenting) (industry cannot set own uncon-
trolled standard).
277. U.C.C. § 4-103. Comment 4 states that the customer must establish that the procedure is
"unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair."
278. 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988).
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suggested by the dissent in Wilder.279 Like the bank in Wilder, it conducted
sight review of all checks over $1,000. In addition, one percent of checks be-
tween $100 and $1,000 were subject to random review. 280 Unlike Medford and
Putnam, the court never mentioned a contractual relationship between the par-
ties. There is no reference to signature cards. The court ignored the require-
ment of Medford and McDowell that the bank's procedure reasonably relate to
the bank's duty to detect forgeries. 28 1
Instead, the court in Zapata concentrated on a cost-benefit analysis of the
bank's practices. The bank presented expert testimony that changing from sight
review to its current procedure saved $125,000 each year and resulted in "no
significant increase in the number of forgeries that went undetected. '282 The
court approved the procedure, concluding that "[aln industry-wide practice that
saves money without significantly increasing the number of forged checks that
the banks erroneously pay is a practice that reflects at least 'ordinary care.' "283
The court went on to state that even if there were an increased number of unde-
tected forgeries, the customer could not prevail unless it demonstrated that the
increased loss due to more forged checks being paid was "unreasonable in light
of the costs that the new practice would save."' 284 Finally, the court explained
why it attached so much importance to costs and benefits. The issue was
whether the bank was negligent. Negligence is judged by what is reasonable
conduct. What is reasonable "is often a matter of costs of prevention compared
with correlative risks of loss. ''285 The court seemed to be saying, in effect, that
the bank's former system of sight review constituted ordinary care. 286 Since the
new procedure is just as effective and costs the bank less money, it also must
constitute ordinary care.
As the above analysis demonstrates, the five recent cases concerning check
forgery detection procedures lack a clear and consistent analytical perspective.
To remedy this situation, the legal community should directly acknowledge and
confront the fundamental differences in approach among the cases, and admit
that such differences involve a social policy choice, not a question of correct
legal application of the UCC. The legal community should then decide what
approach to follow, and determine how best to incorporate that approach into
legal rules.
279. Wilder Binding Co., 135 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 552 N.E.2d at 789 (Calvo, J., dissenting) (bank
procedure utilized in Zapata approved).
280. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294.
281. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 593, 676 P.2d 329, 332 (1984).
282. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294. One of the bank's experts testified that under both the
sight review system and the automated system, the bank's loss through forgeries was $10,000 to
$15,000 per year. Id. The court never questioned this data even though the losses from the Zapata
forgeries alone totalled $109,247.16. Id. at 292.
283. Id. at 295.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. As the Putnam case shows, this is not necessarily true.
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C. The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis
One of the consequences of the Code's injection of the tort concept of ordi-
nary care as the standard for judging the bank's conduct is to make relevant a
cost-benefit analysis of the bank's practices.28 7 Courts typically conduct such an
analysis by applying Judge Learned Hand's negligence test, which has been sum-
marized as follows: the "failure to take precautions constitutes negligence only
when the burden of the accident, assessed in terms of the accident, assessed in
terms of its magnitude and probability of occurrence, exceeds the burden of tak-
ing precautions. ' 28 8 Hand's formulation has gained a wide audience in recent
years as law and economics aficionados, such as Judge Posner, have used it as a
foundation for their efficiency theories. 28 9 Advocates of these theories seek to
quantify every element in the cost-benefit formula.29 0
Not all authorities are so enamored of cost-benefit analysis, however.
Some, such as Professor Vandall, contend not only that some elements cannot be
quantified, 29' but also that a wholesale attempt to quantify everything to deter-
mine negligence is contrary to the traditional concept of negligence, and was
specifically rejected by Judge Hand.292 Professor Waldron points out that the
critical concept of Posner's theory, "efficiency," is an ambiguous term.29 3 Pro-
fessor White debunks the belief that cost-benefit analysis can be objective merely
because it involves numerical calculations. She believes that deciding what con-
stitutes a cost or benefit often involves making value judgments, 294 as does quan-
tifying them. 29 5 Vandall also points out that efficiency theory is founded on
numerous questionable assumptions. For example, the theory assumes that per-
sons alleging injury have perfect information; consequently they know the risks
and evaluate them before entering into a transaction. 296
Professor White also questions the way in which cost-benefit analysis is
287. Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, 173 I1. App. 3d 34, 45, 527 N.E.2d
354, 360-61 (1988) (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
288. McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1400. See also White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned
Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps or a Hand that Hides?, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 77, 104-05 (1990).
Professor White expresses the test as one involving weighing and balancing:
On one side of the scale is the risk of harm, calculated by the harm's severity adjusted for
its probability of occurring... often referred to as 'expected harm.' Balanced against the
'expected harm' on the other side of the scale, is the cost to avoid the harm... If the scale
tilts towards the expected harm, then the cost to avoid harm... is less than the expected
harm... in such a case the defendant is obligated to undertake those precautions, and in
failing to do so, should be liable for any consequential harms.
Id.
289. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972).
290. Vandall, Judge Posner's Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383, 409
(1986).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 413 (quoting Hand's opinion in Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir.
1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1941)).
293. Waldron, Book Review, 99 YALE L.J. 1441, 1443 (1990).
294. White, supra note 288, at 113.
295. Id. at 114.
296. Vandal], supra note 290, at 399.
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used. According to White, even if we can objectively analyze a party's conduct
and agree that the cost of that party taking preventative measures outweighs the
benefits, society may nevertheless decide to impose liability on that party.297 In
other words, taking an economically efficient course of action should not always
guarantee a party protection from liability; other loss allocation schemes may
exist that also promote "economically efficient levels of precaution," such as the
policy of assigning liability to the party who could have avoided the harmful
occurrence at the least cost. 298
Professor Vandall also questions the applicability of the entire cost-benefit
analysis to a determination of whether ordinary care exists. He says the goal of
law should not be efficiency, or wealth maximization, but justice; the definition
of ordinary care should reflect a decision as to "which direction society should
take." 299 According to this theory, defining ordinary care is a value-laden pub-
lic policy decision not susceptible to mere number-crunching. 3° °
Despite the trenchant criticisms of cost-benefit analysis, it remains an allur-
ing construct for determining whether a bank's signature verification system
constitutes a failure to exercise ordinary care. The Medford case illustrates how
banks have argued that costs of intensive check review exceed benefits. The
bank presented data comparing its forgery losses under its former sight review
procedure to those under its current procedure. 30 1 The bank contended that
there was "no significant increase or decrease in forgery losses" as a result of
converting from sight review to bulk filing all checks under $5,000.302 In addi-
tion, the bank estimated that it saved approximately $142,000 each year by
abandoning sight review. 30 3 The bank in Zapata presented comparable evi-
dence; switching from sight review to bulk filing resulted in savings of $125,000
annually and no significant increase in undetected forgeries. 3°4
The type of cost-benefit analysis used in Medford and Zapata is questiona-
ble in several respects. First, it is erroneous to assume that the only relevant
basis of comparison of cost and benefit is between sight review and the bank's
297. See White, supra note 288, at 126 (not requiring party to undertake every conceivable
preventative measure does not mean victim must absorb full costs).
298. Id.
299. Vandall, supra note 290, at 398. See also White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the
Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REv. 577, 612 (1987) (choice about what is best for society must be
based on society's morals, ethics, and legal principles, none of which market prices accurately
reflect).
300. See also Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1272 (1985)
(notion that social world can be expressed meaningfully according to costs and benefits excludes
other ways of perceiving and communicating about social world).
301. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 10, Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank,
66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603) (total number of checks cleared
annually compared to number and percentage of forged checks; total deposits compared to dollar
amount of losses due to forgery; percentage of forgery loss compared to total deposits). See also
Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 592, 676 P.2d at 331 (checks for $5000 or more reviewed).
302. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 10-13, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-
J-l; A-26603).
303. Id. at 11.
304. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988).
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current system of bulk filing. Even courts that find the bank did not exercise
ordinary care do not require sight review of every check. 30 5 Instead, some
courts have set out the more general requirement that banks employ a procedure
that "reasonably relate[s] to the duty the bank has to detect unauthorized signa-
tures. ' ' 3° 6 Under that test, banks may be able to meet the ordinary care stan-
dard by using procedures less costly than sight review of all checks-for
example, sight review of checks over a certain amount and random review of
other checks. 30 7 Another possible alternative to sight review is utilization of
electronic equipment, such as a static signature verification system, to scan
checks for forgeries. 30 8 If such machines are available at reasonable cost and do
not significantly slow check processing, they may be a viable choice. 30 9 Conse-
quently, it is erroneous for a court merely to compare the cost of sight review of
all checks to a bank's current automated method.
The cost-benefit analyses employed by the banks in Medford and Zapata
also were flawed because the courts used the bank's former sight review proce-
dures as the benchmark, and implicitly assumed that those procedures satisfied
the ordinary care standard. As Putnam shows, a bank's sight review procedure
may be so perfunctory that it amounts to negligence. 310 Dr. Lipis, testifying in
Zapata for the bank, provided reasons why sight review tends to be a poor pro-
cedure: " '[S]ignature verification is very tedious, very difficult, and not a func-
tion that is liked by anybody who does it.' ",311 Absent evidence to demonstrate
the reliability of its sight review procedure, a bank cannot properly contend its
current automated procedure is non-negligent merely because it detects as many
forgeries as sight review.
Even if the bank's sight review procedure is facially adequate to meet the
ordinary care standard, the bank's personnel may not follow that procedure.
For example, in Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co., the bank's policy was to have two full-time and one half-time employees
305. See, e.g., Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 593, 676 P.2d at 332 (bank not required
to adopt particular procedure). But cf. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183,
191 n.5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (whether bank must review all checks not addressed by court).
306. McDowell, 772 S.W.2d at 191. Accord Medford, 66 Or. App. at 593, 676 P.2d at 332.
307. See Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294 (sight review of checks over $1000; random review of
one percent of checks between $100-$1000 conducted by bank). The court in McDowell distin-
guished Zapata by noting that in McDowell the bank had no procedure to verify any checks whatso-
ever, whereas the bank in Zapata at least employed some type of process to verify signatures.
McDowell, 772 S.W.2d at 190. The implication is that the McDowell court might well have found
the practice in Zapata constituted ordinary care if the bank also produced evidence that such a
practice was commercially reasonable. See id.
308. Kutler, supra note 123, at 6.
309. These machines possibly could be used in conjunction with other procedures. For exam-
ple, a bank might conduct sight review of large checks and use a static verification system to review a
percentage of smaller checks if it is more efficient than a random review of checks.
310. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 546
N.E.2d 904, 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1989).
311. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294.
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engaged in sight review each day for a total of twenty-one hours per day.3 12
During the period the forged checks were being processed, however, the person
responsible for sight review was absent so frequently that she eventually was
fired.3 13 Consequently, the bank was using only sixty percent of the work force
it had determined was needed to detect forgeries satisfactorily. In addition,
bank employees testified they did not follow the sight review procedures. As the
head teller said, "rules are made to be broken."' 31 4 Courts should not find that
banks fulfill their duty of ordinary care when a cost-benefit analysis is based on
comparing two procedures, one of which often is not followed.
A third problem with the use of a cost-benefit analysis in check forgery
cases relates to the allocation of costs and benefits between the parties. Banks
argue that if they had to return to sight review in order to avoid liability, the
increased costs would be passed on to customers, requiring non-negligent cus-
tomers to subsidize negligent ones. 3 15 In addition, the bank would have to
purchase additional insurance, the cost of which would be passed on to custom-
ers.3 16 Even assuming, arguendo, that sight review is the bank's only alternative
to automated processing, 31 7 the bank's warnings about the increased costs of a
return to sight processing raises the question of who receives the benefits of au-
tomated check processing. 3 18 In Medford, the bank claimed annual savings of
$142,000. 3 19 In Zapata, the savings were $125,000.320 Nowhere do the banks
claim these savings were passed on to the customers. 321 Presumably, whether
customers benefited from the savings depended upon the bank's competitive po-
sition in the marketplace. Thus, a relevant question is: when a court looks at
costs and benefits, whose costs and whose benefits are relevant? A cost-benefit
approach in which customers ultimately pay all the costs of increased protection
and banks receive all the benefits of providing less protection does not appear
312. (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1985) (WESTLAW, States Library, Tenn. file, at 6), rev'd, 730
S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. 1987).
313. Id.
314. Id. Other examples of employees' failure to follow forged-check procedures in this case
include the payment of eight checks containing both forgeries and no dates, and the payment of
checks containing no signatures, even after the account had been identified as a problem account.
Id.
315. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 4, Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank,
66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
316. Id. at 11.
317. See infra note 349 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts allowing banks to
establish alternative procedures.
318. See generally G. MOEBS & E. MOEBS, supra note 12, at 77 (cost efficiency can be passed to
customer or can contribute to profitability).
319. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 11, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1;
A-26603).
320. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988).
321. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank, Wilder Binding Co. v.
Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783 (1990) (No. 67709); Appellant's Brief
and Abstract of Record, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603); Brief for Appellee,
Zapata Corp. (No. 87-1890).
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fair. Some assurance that customers will enjoy lower-cost services in return for
less protection would make cost-benefit analysis seem more just.
Another problem with using a cost-benefit analysis to determine ordinary
care in check forgery cases is how to measure the severity of the harm. The
amount of loss in the five principal cases ranged from $25,254.78322 to
$109,247.16.323 The average loss was $60,720324 and the median loss was
$67,250.23. Assuming these amounts are typical, how is a court to determine
whether or not this constitutes "serious" harm to either party? In Medford, the
bank submitted data comparing total forgery losses to total deposits.325 The loss
was very small when viewed from this perspective. To a large, prosperous busi-
ness customer the loss also would be small. But to a small, struggling business
customer, or to a typical individual consumer, the loss could be devastating. As
Professor White points out in discussing cost-benefit analysis generally, deter-
mining how to quantify costs and benefits involves making value judgments. 32 6
The question here is whether, in using a cost-benefit analysis to determine ordi-
nary care, the courts or legislature should take into consideration the disparate
impact forgery losses have on different types of customers. This is a social policy
judgment that cost-benefit analysis alone cannot resolve. 327
A further defect in the cost-benefit approach is its reliance on questionable
assumptions. For example, the cost-benefit approach, as refined by Judge Pos-
ner, assumes that victims have adequate knowledge of the risks involved in a
transaction. 328 This assumption is false; customers cannot evaluate the risks of
check transactions because most banks do not disclose their signature verifica-
tion procedures, 329 and, as the five principal cases illustrate, bank practice varies
considerably.
In general, however, the Zapata decision demonstrates that banks have a
strong argument for using a cost-benefit analysis to justify their choice of proce-
dures when they present evidence that converting from sight review to bulk fil-
ing does not result in a significant increase in the number of forgeries
detected. 330 It is difficult to justify labeling a bank's bulk filing system a negli-
322. Wilder Binding Co., 135 Ill. 2d at 125, 552 N.E.2d at 784.
323. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 292.
324. See Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 7, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-
J-I; A-26603) (claimed loss of $68,751.56); Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 343, 546 N.E.2d 904, 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (loss of $48,094);
McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (loss of
$52,255.02).
325. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 10-11, Medford Irrigation Dist. (No. 81-1914-
J-l; A-26603).
326. White, supra note 288, at 113.
327. See generally Vandall, supra note 290, at 398.
328. Vandall, supra note 290, at 399.
329. See McDonnell, supra note 11, at 1427 (customers unlikely to guard against forgery);
Murray, supra note 60, at 692 (customer knowledge of bank procedure may encourage forgery).
330. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir.
1988) (evidence that bulk filing did not lead to significant increase in undetected forgeries uncontra-
dicted); Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 10, Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank,
66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603) (conversion led to no significant
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gent practice if it detects forgeries just as well as sight review. Courts should
not, however, seize upon the bank's evidence as decisive in proving their cost-
benefit argument. First, the court should determine whether the bank's sight
review procedure met the ordinary care standard.33 1 Second, the court should
hear evidence on whether bank personnel followed that procedure. 33 2 Third, if
the bank's sight review procedure was not negligent and was generally followed,
the court should review critically the bank's data.333
Finally, the Medford statistics raise the question of how great a burden it
would be to fashion a definition of ordinary care that imposed loss on the bank
unless it had an effective state of the art system to detect forgeries. The bank in
Medford presented data which showed that forgery losses were "infinitesi-
mal," 334 as measured by the number of checks involved335 and by the amount of
each check.336 Credit unions also have experienced "an extremely low loss ra-
tio."' 337 While evidence that a bank pays few checks containing forged signatures
tends to show either that the bank's system is sound or that few forgeries occur,
it also indicates that banks don't face a high risk of substantial losses if they are
held liable under section 4-406(3). Conversely, if many forged checks totalling a
substantial sum are paid, one must question whether the bank's procedure meets
the ordinary care standard.
Even if a bank can show that its sight review or bulk filing procedure is
efficient because the cost of taking further preventative measures outweighs the
benefits, it does not necessarily follow that the customer should bear the loss. As
Professors Cooter and Rubin have shown, cost-benefit analysis does not take
into account many economic, social, and legal considerations of the allocation of
loss. 338 While courts and legislatures ordinarily should not craft rules of loss
allocation that put the loss on an efficient bank, other matters also should be
considered, such as the disparate impact forgery losses have on different types of
change in forgeries detection); Murray, supra note 60, at 708 (banks report no increase in forgery
claims after adopting electronic processing of checks).
331. See McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (Code sets standard; industry cannot set own standard).
332. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case in which bank
personnel testified they did not follow the bank's rules.
333. See supra note 231 and accompanying text for a discussion of discrepancies in the data
presented in the Medford brief making evaluation of that data difficult.
334. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 25, Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank,
66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
335. Id. at 10.
336. Id. at 11.
337. Siebold & Kessler, Credit Unions and Check Truncation, 44 Bus. LAW. 1096, 1098 (1989).
338. See supra notes 102-73, 297-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of how cost-benefit
analysis ignores many significant factors in dispute resolution that are considered when the analyti-
cal framework includes the principles of loss spreading, loss reduction, and loss imposition. See also
Waldron, supra note 293, at 1450 (reliance on single overarching principle rejected); White, supra
note 288, at 126 (assigning liability to party who can avoid result at least cost is alternative to cost-
benefit analysis and promotes efficiency). Waldron believes tort law is "extremely complex and ...
resists simple analysis." Waldron, supra note 293, at 1450 (quoting J. Coleman, Markets, Morals and
the Law 189 (1989)).
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customers, the appropriateness of encouraging banks to develop innovative tech-
nology (which may eventually allow them to take precautions at the lower cost
in most instances) and the need to have a reliable national financial services
industry. A court taking all of these factors into consideration may allocate loss
to the same party as a court taking into account only the limited type of cost-
benefit analysis urged by some banks. It is important, nevertheless, for a court
to recognize the complexity of the issues before it and not to rely exclusively on
a superficial cost-benefit approach.
IV. THE NEW, IMPROVED (?) SECTION 4-406
The foregoing review of the statutory scheme and case law relating to sec-
tion 4-406, and an analysis of an economic theory of loss allocation, demon-
strates the inadequacy of the current UCC formulation. Courts attempting to
apply the concept of ordinary care to the bank's practices not only reach con-
flicting results, but also employ very different modes of analysis. Banks and
customers need a new version of section 4-406 that provides courts with greater
guidance as to what constitutes acceptable bank conduct in regard to signature
verification. The project of the American Law Institute and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to revise Article 4 presented
the opportunity to accomplish this objective.3 39
Revised section 4-406's treatment of liability for a series of checks with
forged signatures is similar to current section 4-406; the customer is precluded
from holding the bank liable for a forged check if he or she fails to promptly
notify the bank of "relevant facts. ' '34° If the "customer proves that the bank
339. Rubin, supra note 1, at 621.
340. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406. The relevant portions of revised § 4-
406 provide:
Section 4-406. Customer's Duty To Discover and Report Unauthorized Signature or
Alteration
(1) A bank that sends or makes available to a customer a statement of account show-
ing payment of items for the account shall either return to the customer the items paid or
provide information in the statement of account sufficient to allow the customer to identify
the items paid. The statement of account provides sufficient information if the item is
described by item number, amount, and date of payment.
(2) If the items are not returned to the customer, the person retaining the items shall
either retain the items or, if the items are destroyed, maintain the capacity to furnish legible
copies of the items until the expiration of seven years after receipt of the items. A customer
may request an item from the bank that paid the item, and that bank must provide in a
reasonable time either the item or, if the item has been destroyed or is not otherwise obtain-
able, a legible copy of the item.
(3) If a bank sends or makes available a statement of account or items pursuant to
subsection (1), the customer shall exercise reasonable promptness in examining the state-
ment or the items to determine whether any payment was not authorized because of an
alteration of an item or because a purported signature by or on behalf of the customer was
not authorized. If, based on the statement or items provided, the customer should reason-
ably have discovered the unauthorized payment, the customer has a duty to give prompt
notification to the bank of the relevant facts.
(4) If the bank proves that the customer failed with respect to an item to comply with
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failed to exercise ordinary care in paying the item and that the failure substan-
tially contributed to loss," a comparative negligence scheme allocates loss be-
tween the parties. If the customer proves that the bank did not pay the check in
good faith, the preclusion does not apply and the customer may demand that the
bank credit his or her account.
A. The New Definition of Ordinary Care
New definitions of key terms are crucial to the operation of the revised
section. As in the present section 4-406, "ordinary care" remains a critical stan-
dard of conduct in the revised Code. The revision, however, treats ordinary care
in a strikingly different manner than the present Code. While the present Code
contains no definition of ordinary care,34 ' the revision, in sharp contrast, not
only contains a definition in Article 3, which deals generally with negotiable
instruments, but also makes a specific reference to ordinary care as it applies to a
bank's check examination procedure under Article 4.
Revised Article 3 defines ordinary care solely as it applies to "a person
engaged in business."' 342 For such a person, ordinary care means the "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which that
person is located, with respect to the business in which that person is en-
gaged." 34 3 Ordinary care, therefore, is equated with reasonable commercial
standards. This treatment is consistent with cases applying section 4-406 in
which the two terms also were equated. 344
The word "tort" is not used in Revised Article 3's definitional section or in
the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (3) the customer is precluded from as-
serting against the bank
(a) the customer's unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank
also establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure; and
(b) the customer's unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any
other item paid in good faith by the bank if the payment was made before the bank received
notification from the customer of the unauthorized signature or alteration and after the
customer had been afforded a reasonable period of time in which to examine the item or
statement of account and notify the bank. "Reasonable period of time" is presumed to be
14 calendar days after the item or statement pursuant to subsection (1) was received by or
made available to the customer.
(5) If subsection (4) applies and the customer proves that the bank failed to exercise
ordinary care in paying the item and that the failure substantially contributed to loss, the
loss is allocated between the customer precluded and the bank asserting the preclusion
according to the extent to which the failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to
the loss. If the customer proves that the bank did not pay the item in good faith, the
preclusion under subsection (4) does not apply.
341. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4 provides: "The term 'ordinary care' is not defined and is used
here with its normal tort meaning and not in any special sense relating to bank collections. No
attempt is made in the Article to define in toto what constitutes ordinary care or lack of it."
342. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Revised Article 3 - Negotiable Instruments § 3-
103(aX7) (Proposed Final Draft, Revised May 10, 1990), in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES
app. VI (1990 ed.) [hereinafter Revision Draft -- article 3] (includes Conforming and Miscellaneous
Amendments to UCC).
343. Id.
344. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 293 (1st Cir. 1988);
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its commentary. Moreover, tort is not mentioned in revised section 4-406 or its
commentary. The revision consequently avoids the confusion engendered by the
present commentary, which both rejects and adopts the view that ordinary care
is a tort concept that requires evaluating the bank's conduct by relating it to
bank check processing.345 By tying ordinary care to commercial reasonableness,
and in no longer describing ordinary care in tort terms, the revision, when ex-
amined in light of the present Code, appears to have rejected the tort concept
altogether. This rejection simplifies analysis of section 4-406 since courts no
longer need to interpret the tort concept of ordinary care within the general
context of the contractual relationship between the parties. 34 6
B. Sight Review is not Required
The revision of section 4-406 also focuses on banks' check collection proce-
dures. While it does not prescribe what conduct meets the standard of commer-
cial reasonableness, it does provide that if the bank uses automated methods to
process checks, the requirement to comply with the commercial reasonableness
standard "do[es] not require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to
examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's proce-
dures do not vary unreasonably from general banking usage not disapproved by
this Article [3] or Article 4."347 One of the comments to revised section 4-406
states that the drafters' intent is to reject those cases that hold that failure to use
sight reviews constitutes lack of ordinary care as a matter of law. 348
The comment does not reflect accurately the status of current case law,
however. As discussed previously, although courts are divided, those consider-
ing this issue in the last decade have not required sight review. The courts have
pointed out that other procedures, such as random examination of a small per-
centage of checks within a given dollar range, may fulfill the bank's duty. 349
Courts that have found that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care have done
so only in cases where the bank had no procedure for examining checks in the
amount at issue.
The revision of section 4-406 also fails to provide guidance in resolving the'
"reasonably related" issue. Courts that have found the bank negligent have re-
Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 592-93, 676 P.2d 329, 332 (1984);
McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
345. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4. See supra notes 33, 37 and accompanying text for a discussion
of whether the meaning of ordinary care should take bank collections into account and whether
general banking usage is prima facie ordinary care.
346. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of action against a negligent
bank under U.C.C. article 4, vis-a-vis an independent tort action.
347. Revision Draft - article 3, supra note 342, at § 3-103(a)(7).
348. See Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406 comment 4 (intent is to allow
banks to employ procedure other than sight examination if procedure is reasonable and is generally
followed by similar banks in area).
349. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of procedures that reason-
ably relate to the detection of forgeries. The revision and comment provide guidance to courts in
future cases that might otherwise hold that failure to engage in sight review is negligent. Revision
Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406 & comment.
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quired it to establish a procedure that "reasonably relate[s] to the duty the bank
has to detect unauthorized signatures."35 These decisions do not provide banks
or customers with guidance on what procedures are acceptable. The revised
section is of no help. The definition of ordinary care states that the bank is not
required "to examine the instrument if the failure to examine does not violate
the bank's prescribed procedures."' 35 1 But the revision goes on to require that
the bank's procedures "not vary unreasonably from general banking usage not
disapproved by this Article [3] or Article 4. '"352 This merely tells the bank, in
effect, to draft procedures that do not require examination of checks as long as
those procedures are not totally out of line with the practices of other banks.
C. General Banking Usage Standard Fails to Address the Fundamental Issue
The current Code explains in a comment that general banking usage is de-
termined by looking at bank practices within the bank's geographical area.3 53
The Code is silent on whether small credit unions must show their practices are
similar to those of other small credit unions in the area, or whether all financial
institutions of any size or type must show their procedures are similar to those of
all other financial institutions within that locality. The revision of section 4-406,
like the current Code, 354 allows the bank to prove that its conduct constitutes
ordinary care by showing it is consistent with general banking usage. The revi-
sion, however, includes a comment that provides helpful guidelines on how to
apply the concept of general banking usage; it provides that the proper focus of
sight review is on whether that practice "is commonly followed by other compa-
rable banks in the area."'355
The problem with the revision is that it avoids entirely the central issue of
the bank's duty in regard to detecting forged signatures. The revision retains the
current Code's basic scheme, holding the bank liable for paying forged checks.
It requires not only that the bank that paid a forged check have a procedure that
is similar to those of other banks, but also that the practices of these other banks
are those "not disapproved" by the Code.356 This language puts banks and cus-
tomers right back where they started. Although the revised Code makes clear in
a comment that when a customer fails to report forgeries promptly the bank is
not liable simply because it did not employ sight review, 357 the revision does not
address the question of whether the bank still has some type of duty in the detec-
tion of forgeries. It states that the bank is not required to examine checks if it
350. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
Accord Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 593, 676 P.2d 329, 332 (1984).
351. Revision Draft - article 3, supra note 342, at § 3-103(a)(7).
352. Id.
353. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 4.
354. Id. at § 4-103(3). See supra note 99 for the relevant text of current section 4-103(3).
355. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406 comment 4. Presumably, courts can
extend the "comparable bank" standard to all types of bank practices; there is no apparent reason to
confine it to sight review.
356. Revision Draft - article 3, supra note 342, at § 3-103(a)(7).
357. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406 comment 4.
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conforms to general banking usage and if that usage is not disapproved by the
Code. Does that mean the procedure utilized by the credit union in McDowell
constitutes ordinary care because there is no specific disapproval of it in the
Code?358 Or does the Code's loss allocation scheme, which generally imposes
liability on the bank for forgeries, mean' that the Code disapproves of a proce-
dure that contains no forgery examination of any checks? The failure to answer
these questions leaves us with a revised Code which, like the present Code, vio-
lates the loss imposition principle because it does not reduce the probability of
using litigation to clarify this legal question.
D. Proving the Bank's Negligence Substantially Contributed to the Loss
Under the revised UCC, not only must customers prove the bank failed to
exercise ordinary care, but they also must prove that "the failure substantially
contributed to loss." 359 The addition of language requiring proof of causation
creates uncertainty and increases the likelihood that customers will not be able
to escape full liability even though they can prove the bank has failed to exercise
ordinary care.
Current section 4-406(3) is silent on the issue of causation. The Medford
court, interpreting this section to impose strict liability on the bank once the
customer proved the bank's negligence, stated: "There is thus no issue as to the
causal relationship between the bank's lack of due care and the customer's loss if
the loss is established. ' ' 36° Other courts have required proof of causation despite
the silence of section 4-406(3).361
Revised section 4-406 resolves the conflict among the courts by explicitly
requiring proof of causation. The confusion with-and litigation resulting
from-the issue of causation will not cease, however, because the drafters chose
the same language for revised section 4-406 as that used in current section 3-406;
such language engendered substantial case law as the courts have attempted to
apply the ambiguous standard to a variety of fact patterns. 362 The comment to
358. See McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W. 2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (credit union employed no mechanism for reviewing signatures).
359. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406(5). See supra note 340 for the text of
revised section 4406(5).
360. Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 595, 676 P.2d 329, 333
(1989).
361. See, e.g., American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. Isaac, 636 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981), afid, 675 P.2d 742 (Colo. 1984); Vending Chattanooga Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Tenn. 1987). The American Heritage court found justification for
requiring proof of causation from U.C.C. § 4-103(5) and comment 6 to that section. 636 P.2d at
1298. These provide that the measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary care is the amount
of the check minus the amount which would have been lost even if the bank had exercised ordinary
care. U.C.C. § 4-103(5) & comment 6. In other words, unless the customer can establish a causal
link between the bank's negligence and the loss, the customer cannot prove any damages. See B.
CLARK, supra note 31, 8.02 [4][c], at 8-1.
362. Compare Thompson Maple Prod. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 211 Pa. Super. 42, 47, 234 A.2d
32, 36 (1967) (section 3-406 changes pre-Code law by shortening causal chain) and Insurance Co. of
North Am. v. Purdue Nat'l Bank, 401 N.E.2d. 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) with Commonwealth v.
National Bank & Trust Co., 469 Pa. 188, 364 A.2d 1331 (1976) (section 3-406 did not change pre-
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revised section 3-406 attempts to clarify the "substantially contributes" test by
explaining that it "is meant to be less stringent than a 'direct and proximate'
test."1363 The comment even sets out three hypothetical situations to provide
guidance.364 Even if the comment will assist the parties and the courts when
they confront actual situations governed by section 3-406,365 it is not likely to
help them resolve controversies raised under section 4-406; section 3-406 applies
the "substantially contributes" test to the customer's negligence in storing and
preparing checks, whereas section 4-406 applies the test to the bank's negligence
in processing checks, an altogether different situation. Therefore, it is likely that
uncertainty over the the meaning of the "substantially contributes" test will re-
sult in expensive litigation, thus violating the loss imposition principle.
Revised section 4-406's requirement that the customer prove the failure to
exercise ordinary care substantially contributed to the loss would protect the
bank from liability in cases involving "perfect forgeries." That is, if the bank
can show that the forgery was so well done that it would have paid the check
even if it had exercised ordinary care, for example, by employing a reasonable
system of sight review, the bank would escape liability. Upon initial considera-
tion, this sounds reasonable. Why should the bank be penalized for negligent
procedures if the same harm would have occurred if the bank had exercised
care?
Case law is split on the question of whether the bank is liable for "perfect
forgeries." As a general rule, the bank is liable for paying any check containing
an unauthorized signature, including a forgery. 36 6 This is so whether or not the
bank could have detected the forgery.367 Some courts apply this strict liability
rule in finding a bank negligent for check processing under section 4-406 and
hold that the bank cannot meet its duty of ordinary care by claiming the forgery
was so "artistic" that it could not be spotted. 368 Other courts reach a different
result under section 4-406 when there is a perfect forgery. 369 Once the customer
fails to report forged signatures promptly, the bank is liable only if it fails to
Code law). See also National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Pa. Commw. 358, 305 A.2d 769 (1973),
rev'd, 469 Pa. 188, 364 A.2d 1331 (1976).
363. Revision Draft - article 3, supra note 342, at § 3-406 comment 2.
364. Id. comment 3.
365. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, at 692 (case law involves "similar but often
distinctively elaborate factual webs"). The cases do not develop any principles, however. Id. at 693.
366. See U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (unauthorized signature wholly inoperative as customer signature);
id. § 1-201(43) (unauthorized signature includes forgery); id. § 4-401(1) (bank may only charge
"properly payable" checks against customer account).
367. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 31, 8.02[2], at 8-9 (under doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3
Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), drawee bank cannot shift liability to party transferring
check where check contains forged signature and bank paid, even when forgery was so skillful that
bank could not detect it).
368. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
First Nat'l Bank v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
369. Industrial Systems v. American Nat'l Bank, 376 So. 2d 742, 745 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); K
& K Mfg. v. Union Bank, 129 Ariz. 7, 9-10, 628 P.2d 44, 48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Ossip-Harris Ins.
v. Barnett Bank, 428 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Zenith Syndicate, Inc. v. Marine
Midland Bank, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1267, 1269 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
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exercise ordinary care. That means the bank is not liable for detecting "perfect
forgeries." In fact, the bank need not utilize procedures designed to detect espe-
cially skillful forgeries, such as employing handwriting experts, because ordinary
care sets a lower standard. Shielding the bank from liability when the exercise of
ordinary care would not have resulted in detecting the forgery also is consistent
with the damages scheme of section 4-103(5).37o The revised code apparently
resolves this conflict by requiring proof of causation.
Assuming this is a fair resolution, two problems with revised section 4-406's
requirement of proof of causation remain. First, imposing a causation require-
ment on the customer at best encourages swearing contests between experts at
trial. The customer's expert will testify that the forgery was not very skillful; if
the bank had used an acceptable detection procedure, the forgery would have
been spotted. The bank's expert will swear that the forgery is nearly perfect and
that no reasonable procedure would have caught it. This battle of experts makes
the case costly for both sides;371 ultimately the finder of fact must decide the
case based on which expert is more credible or based on the finder of fact's own
judgment as to the quality of the forgery. This approach violates the loss impo-
sition principle, prevents customers from filing potentially meritorious claims
because of expense, and results in law that is not certain or predictable.
Second, where a perfect forgery is not involved, it is unclear what the cus-
tomer must prove under revised section 4-406 to show causation. The difficul-
ties in interpreting and applying the "substantially contributes" test are
illustrated by situations in which a bank employs a random examination proce-
dure and fails to meet the ordinary care standard. This may happen, for exam-
ple, where the bank randomly examines only one-tenth of one percent of all
checks and the customer proves it is not a high enough percentage to meet the
standard. 372 Under the revised Code, the customer must then prove this failure
substantially contributed to the loss resulting from the forgery. It is not clear
what the customer must do to satisfy this requirement. If a bank uses random
review, causation is always proved because there is a significant likelihood the
customer's check will not be examined. Consequently, the bank contributes to
the loss by not detecting the forgery and by not refusing to pay the check. Once
the customer proves that the bank's random review procedure does not meet
minimal ordinary care standards, the customer logically would not have to show
anything else to establish causation.
370. U.C.C. § 4-103(5). Section 4-103(5) currently provides in pertinent part: "The measure of
damages for failure to exercise ordinary care... is the amount of the item reduced by an amount
which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care, and where there is bad faith... other
damages... suffered ... as a proximate consequence."
371. First Nat'l Bank v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (much time
at trial spent on expert testimony about quality of forged signatures).
372. Another example is a bank's use of a static signature verification system that fails to detect
forgeries in a large percentage of cases. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the use of static signature verification systems to detect forgeries.
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E. The Comparative Negligence Conundrum
Revised section 4-406 adopts a comparative negligence approach to loss
allocation. 373 Comparative negligence may be more fair than contributory neg-
ligence in traditional tort cases. 374 In the section 4-406 context, however; it
violates the loss imposition principle, is contrary to several Code objectives, and
obfuscates any conceptual clarity gained by defining ordinary care in terms of
commercial reasonableness rather than tort.
1. The Pros and Cons of Comparative Negligence
Dissatisfaction with contributory negligence schemes in the context of auto-
mobile accident cases has led most states to adopt the doctrine of comparative
negligence. 375 Advocates of comparative negligence believe it is a fairer system
since it is unjust to allocate loss solely to the plaintiff where both sides are at
fault. 376 The unfairness is most pronounced where the degree of the plaintiff's
culpability is slight and that of the defendant is great. 3 7 7
If the degree of negligence of each party is roughly the same, however,
apportionment of loss becomes problematic. States have adopted different types
of comparative negligence schemes. Several states have adopted "pure" compar-
ative negligence, in which the plaintiff's damages are reduced in accordance
with his or her degree of fault. 378 Most states have enacted one of two different
modified forms of comparative negligence. Under the first approach, the plain-
tiff can recover only if less than fifty percent of the fault can be attributed to him
or her.379 The other form of modified comparative negligence allows the plain-
tiff to recover as long as he or she is not more than fifty percent culpable.38 0
Under both types of modified comparative negligence, if the plaintiff's negli-
gence exceeds the acceptable quantum, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering
anything. In effect, the contributory negligence approach applies at that
point. 3 1 Two states adopt a third regime, whereby the comparative negligence
allocation takes effect only if the plaintiff's damages are "slight" compared to
the defendant's. 382
While comparative negligence appears fairer than the one-side-take-all ap-
proach of contributory negligence, it has been criticized on several grounds.
Commentators deride the notion that juries can determine degree of fault with
373. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406(5).
374. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Ten-
nessee, 57 TENN. L. REv. 199, 230-32 (1990).
375. Id. at 228.
376. Keeton, Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should
the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 889, 912-13 (1968); Mutter, supra note 374, at
231.
377. Mutter, supra note 374, at 231.
378. Id. at 228-29.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 230.
382. Id.
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the precision required by the percentage limits. 38 3 Under any form of compara-
tive negligence, "the apportionment of fault among culpable parties is a highly
intuitive undertaking. ' 384 As a result, there is little consistency among the cases
and it is difficult to discern "definite guidelines."' 385 Finally, while comparative
negligence may be ideally suited to automobile accident cases, it is inappropriate
in many other contexts. 38 6
2. Revised Code's Approach to Comparative Negligence
Despite both the reservations expressed by critics about the operation of
comparative negligence in the traditional tort context and the disagreement
among state legislatures over which form of comparative negligence is superior,
the revised Code adopts use of the "pure" approach. This is distinctly a minor-
ity position, having been adopted by only thirteen of the forty-four states that
have enacted comparative negligence to govern loss allocation in tort cases.38 7
Revised section 4-406 provides that if the customer proves that the bank failed
to exercise ordinary care and it "substantially contributes" to the loss, the loss is
then allocated between the customer and the bank "according to the extent to
which the failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss. '"388
Although this represents a radical departure from the the stance of the current
Code, the comment to revised section 4-406 is completely silent on the introduc-
tion of comparative negligence; no explanation of or justification for the substan-
tially increased burden placed upon the customer is offered.
3. Arguments Opposing Comparative Negligence in the Section 4-406
Context
Although a recent federal banking regulation adopts comparative negli-
gence in transactions between banks, 38 9 courts have refused to apply this doc-
trine in section 4-406 cases. 390 The New York Court of Appeals in Putnam
provided two rationales for reversing the lower court's application of compara-
tive negligence. First, the court found that the Code's scheme of loss allocation
383. Id. at 234.
384. Id. at 235.
385. Id.
386. Malone, Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should
the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 889, 934 (1968).
387. Mutter, supra note 374, at 228-29.
388. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406(5).
389. Regulation CC, promulgated pursuant to the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4001-4010, incorporates a scheme of comparative negligence as between banks under certain cir-
cumstances. 12 C.F.R. § 229.38 (c)(1990). See generally B. CLARK, supra note 31, 7.14(2][k], at
7-53.
390. See Five Towns College v. Citibank, 108 A.D.2d 420, 489 N.Y.S.2d 338 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (comparative fault considerations alter rights under U.C.C. § 4-406); Vending Chattanooga v.
American Nat'l Bank, 730 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Tenn. 1987) (no comparative fault under code); Behring
Int'l v. Greater Houston Bank, 662 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (comparative negligence inap-
plicable in breach of contract suit).
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represents a "carefully drawn balance, ' 391 which comparative negligence princi-
ples would upset. The revised Code upsets the same balance without explana-
tion. Possibly the drafters believed the present Code makes it too easy for
customers to prevail despite the prima facie rule of section 4-103(3). If so, this
belief must be based on something other than published modem case law, for,
during the past ten years, customers have prevailed under section 4-103(3) in
few cases. 39 2 Perhaps the drafters believed that the Code's loss allocation
scheme as a whole unduly favors customers and that section 4-406(3) is an ap-
propriate vehicle for correcting that imbalance. The conclusion that Article 4
has a pro-customer bias in need of correction would certainly represent startling
revisionism, however, since, at the time it was proposed, Article 4 was acknowl-
edged universally to have been written by the banks and for the banks.393
Whatever the motivation, comparative negligence weights the balance far more
heavily on the side of the bank, as explained below.
The second rationale given by the Putnam court in rejecting comparative
negligence was that the objective of the Code is different from that of tort law. 394
Tort law imposes liability on the basis of fault. Liability varies from case to case
depending on the facts. The UCC promotes "certainty and predictability" as
well as "efficiency in dispute resolution."' 39 5 The current Code is consistent with
these objectives; once the customer proves the bank failed to exercise ordinary
care, loss shifts to the bank. Under the revision, however, the amorphous pro-
cess of assigning liability under comparative negligence leaves it unclear whether
the bank or the customer ultimately bears the loss, even after the customer
proves that the bank lacked ordinary care and that the bank's conduct substan-
tially contributed to the loss. In addition, as the Putnam court pointed out,
comparative negligence is contrary to efficient dispute resolution because of the
fact-intensive issues the court is required to hear, evaluate, and rule on.396 The
Putnam court's concern with efficient dispute resolution echoes the economist's
disfavor of legal rules that violate the loss imposition principle. 397
391. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 349, 546
N.E.2d 904, 908, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 615 (1989). See also Five Towns College, 108 A.D.2d at 429-30,
489 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (Code's rules on loss allocation represent attempt to be equitable).
392. See Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 348-49, 546 N.E.2d at 906-07, 547
N.Y.S.2d at 615 (bank liable if failed to exercise ordinary care); Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western
Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 593-97, 676 P.2d 329, 332-34 (1984) (bank liable if failed to follow reason-
able commercial banking practice); McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183,
191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (credit union liable for failure to exercise ordinary care).
393. Beutel, supra note 81, at 361-62; Gilmore, supra note 37, at 374-75; Leary & Schmitt,
supra note 81, at 613-14.
394. See Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 349, 546 N.E.2d at 908, 547 N.Y.S.2d at
615 (UCC promotes certainty and predictability).
395. Id.
396. See id. (Code's goals not advanced by fact inquiries required under comparative
negligence).
397. Id. The Putnam court also states that one of the Code's goals is "allocating responsibility
to the party best able to prevent the loss by the exercise of care." 74 N.Y.2d at 349, 546 N.E.2d at
908, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 615. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of efficient
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4. Problems in Applying the Revised Code's Comparative Negligence
While the revised Code's definition of ordinary care fits much more com-
fortably within the contractual context of customer-bank relations by eliminat-
ing confusing references to tort law, revised section 4-406(5) reintroduces tort
with a vengeance by invoking comparative negligence, and, in the process, cre-
ates great conceptual confusion. Under revised section 4-406(5), the customer
must prove the bank failed to exercise ordinary care; ordinary care is defined as
commercially reasonable co-aduct. 398 But if the customer proves that the bank
failed to exercise ordinary care, and that the failure substantially contributed to
the loss, 399 the loss is allocated according to how much each party's failure to
exercise ordinary care "contributed to the loss."'4'0 In other words, to deter-
mine loss, the court must look at both the customer's lack of ordinary care in
failing to report promptly, and the bank's lack of ordinary care in processing the
forged check. The definition of ordinary care is stripped of tort baggage, but
then applied within the tort framework of comparative negligence. Thus, tort
concepts are eased out the back door and welcomed back in through the front.
It will be a challenge for the court to instruct the jury on how to apply the
concept of ordinary care, which is no longer defined in tort terms, in a compara-
tive negligence scheme. Ordinarily, juries apportion losses in comparative negli-
gence cases according to the relative fault of each party.4 " Is the jury supposed
to apportion loss under revised section 4-406 according to which party is the
most commercially unreasonable?
The difficulties go even beyond that, however. Revised section 3-103(a)(7)
defines ordinary care as it applies to "a person engaged in business." There is no
definition of ordinary care for those customers who are individual consumers.
Arguably, since the drafters were so precise in defining ordinary care in revised
section 3-103(a)(7), they did not intend it to apply to consumers. Presumably,
the customary tort definition of ordinary care is applicable.4° 2 If these assump-
tions are correct, an individual consumer's portion of the loss is judged on the
basis of his or her culpability, and the bank's portion of the loss is determined
based on its lack of commercial reasonableness. While juries may be able to "do
the right thing," it is conceptually awkward and probably confusing for juries to
use two different standards of ordinary care in apportioning loss. 4 °3
An examination of the facts in some of the commercial cases illustrates the
difficulty of applying comparative negligence. Despite the fact that every section
4-406(3) case involves a customer deemed negligent by its failure to report
rules, such as strict liability; supra notes 106-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the devel-
opment of new bank practices and technology as placing additional burdens on customers.
398. Revision Draft - article 3, supra note 342, at § 3-103(a)(7).
399. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-46(5).
400. Id.
401. W. KEETON, supra note 35, at 472.
402. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (unless displaced by Code, general principles of law apply).
403. See infra notes 440-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of further difficulties that
the revision creates in consumer cases; for example, the revision fails to require notice to consumers
of their rights and obligations under the law or to provide an error resolution procedure.
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promptly, the degree of negligence varies considerably. In Medford, the wrong-
doer's conduct involved only nine checks4c' amounting to almost $69,000,
forged over a period of a mere three weeks. 405 In Zapata, the thief forged 224
checks4° 6 totalling over $109,000 over a period of five months .40 7 In McDowell,
the bank alleged the officers never examined the bank statement, 4° s but in Put-
nam, the customer claimed its officers reviewed the statement and their account-
ant made "periodic 'surprise' reconciliations" of the checkbook. 409 Fact finders
may sympathize with customers such as Wilder Binding, which have few em-
ployees,41 0 and where it is relatively more burdensome to closely monitor the
bookkeeper. 4 11 The customer also may appear less blameworthy in the eyes of
the finder of fact when the case involves fewer forged checks, a smaller amount
of money, a short period of time before discovery, a small firm, or a more sophis-
ticated forgery scheme.
Likewise, bank conduct that falls below the ordinary care standard may
take many forms. Finders of fact may consider banks that conduct sight re-
view4 12 less negligent than banks that engage in no review of any kind, such as
the credit union in McDowell.4 13 Some finders of fact may be influenced by the
bank's failure to heed suspicious circumstances. In Medford, for example, two
bank employees testified that the forged signatures were noticeably different
from those on the signature card4 14 and two of the forged checks caused over-
drafts of $22,000 and over $19,000. 4 1 5 While the Code specifically authorizes
banks to pay checks even if they cause overdrafts, 4 16 if the customer never had
404. Respondents' Brief and Supplemental Abstract of Record at 7, Medford Irrigation Dist. v.
Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
405. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 591, 676 P.2d at 331.
406. Brief for Appellee at 3, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d
291 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1890).
407. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 292.
408. Brief of Appellee at 33, McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1989) (No. 05-88-00652-CV).
409. Brief of Defendant-Respondent Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company at 4, Putnam
Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 546 N.E.2d 904, 547 N.Y.S.2d
611 (1989) (No. 2290-86).
410. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Wilder Binding Company at 7, Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak
Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 552 N.E.2d 783 (1990) (No. 67709).
411. Id. The customer in Zapata, however, tried to garner sympathy despite its size by explain-
ing that its failure to discover the forgeries was caused by the confusion surrounding a massive
corporate restructuring, office relocations, and difficulties encountered in computerizing its account-
ing and payroll reconciliation procedure. Appellants' Brief at 2, Zapata Corp. (No. 87-1890).
412. See SURVEY, supra note 94, at 119 Table 35E (52.4% of responding banks with assets less
than $100 million verified all signatures before payment, 24.1% of banks with assets between $100
and $500 million verified all signatures, 13.2% of banks with assets between $500 million and $1
billion verified all signatures, and 7.2% of remainder verified all signatures).
413. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
414. Respondents' Brief and Supplemental Abstract of Record at 6-7, Medford Irrigation Dist.
v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
415. Id. at 5.
416. U.C.C. § 4-401. Section 4-401 provides that a bank may charge against a customer's ac-
count "any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account even though the charge
creates an overdraft." Id.
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an overdraft before, if the amounts of the overdrafts were significant in relation
to the customer's normal balance, and if the signatures on the checks causing the
overdrafts were obvious forgeries, the finder of fact may regard payment of the
overdraft unfavorably in allocating blame between the parties.
Finders of fact also may take into consideration the failure of the bank to
follow the express terms of its contract with the customer (where such failure
may have encouraged the thefts), and its failure to maintain even minimal identi-
fication procedures (which permitted the thefts to continue). For example, the
trial court in Putnam took into consideration the bank's previous payment of
five checks containing only one signature4 17 despite its obligation under contract
to pay only checks containing two authorized signatures. 41 s The customer sug-
gested that the embezzling bookkeeper may have taken the bank's payment of
these improperly signed checks as an indication that the bank would honor her
forged checks as well. 419 The bank in McDowell failed to establish any proce-
dure to verify signatures on checks presented for payment over the counter at
the bank's branches. 420 If the wrongdoer had tried to cash the checks at the
main office, the bank's procedure required the teller to compare the check's sig-
nature with that on the signature card.42 1 None of the branches had signature
cards or copies of the cards; consequently, the bookkeeper was able to cash the
checks and continue to forge additional checks because the bank's procedures
foreclosed any opportunity for the bank to detect forgeries at branches. A finder
of fact might find such a procedure particularly egregious given the ease with
which the bank could have made signature cards or their copies available to
branches4 22 and because the bank also had a policy not to examine any checks
which were not presented to the bank in person.
Despite the variety of fact patterns present in these cases, they are far less
complicated than many others in which finders of fact are called upon to apply
comparative negligence. Policy questions arise, however, because the conduct of
customers and banks in section 4-406(3) situations cannot be quantified. How is
the finder of fact supposed to compare degrees of culpability in the Putnam case?
The customer failed to detect the forgeries in thirty-seven checks for ten months.
The officers and their accountant, however, periodically reviewed the book-
keeper's work, but failed to discover the thief's scheme, which was designed to
avoid easy detection.423 The bank was careful enough to employ sight review.
417. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 546 N.E.2d 904, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1989) (No. 2290-86).
418. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 546 N.E.2d at 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d at
612.
419. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. (No. 2290-86).
420. Appellants' Brief at 8-9, McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (No. 05-88-00652-CV).
421. Id. at 9.
422. See Violano, The High-Tech Future of Foiling Fraud and Forgery, BANKERS MONTHLY
35, 36 (April 1989) (many banks now use computers that allow teller to retrieve image of signature
in less than two seconds).
423. Brief of Defendant-Respondent Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company at 4, Putnam
Rolling Ladder Co. (No. 2290-86).
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On the other hand, each check was examined for no more than four seconds. 424
The system obviously did not work very well, since thirty-seven forgeries went
undetected, and checks containing only one signature instead of the required
two also were not spotted.425 Many finders of fact may follow the example of
the Putnam trial court. It applied comparative negligence and ruled that each
side was equally at fault, thereby reducing the customer's award by 50%.426
Because of the impossibility of precision, other finders of fact considering identi-
cal facts might consider the customer far more negligent because so many for-
geries involving so much money went undetected for so long. Still others might
be more influenced by what they regard as the bank's failure to adopt a proce-
dure that had a reasonable chance of detecting any forgeries and find the bank
the overwhelmingly negligent party.
Because of the variety of fact patterns present and the impracticability of
quantifying instances of negligent conduct, it is likely that the comparative negli-
gence scheme will encourage extensive discovery and fact-intensive trials, thus
violating the loss imposition principle. In addition, the incorporation of com-
parative negligence will make the results in a given case unpredictable, even
when the customer can prove lack of ordinary care and causation. This violates
the commercial law's objectives of predictability and stability. Allocating loss
based on comparative negligence pushes a commercial transaction arising out of
a contract for financial services into a loss allocation scheme designed to govern
accidental injury.
F. Does the Revised Code Strike the Proper Balance?
The revised Code upsets the balance established under the present Code by
making it more difficult and costly for the customer to shift the loss for the
forged check back to the bank.427 This change is proposed despite the drafters'
failure to substantiate any undue burden imposed upon banks by the current
Code.4 28 Supporters of the revised Code can justify tipping the balance further
against customers by contending that the customer is the party who can avoid
the loss at the least cost by taking precautions to prevent forgeries and by
promptly detecting and reporting any forgeries that occur. Although this is a
powerful argument, other factors should be taken into account as well, such as
whether customers will be able to bear the risk at a lower cost than banks,
whether banks will have sufficient incentives to develop technological innova-
424. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 344, 546 N.E.2d at 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
425. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. (No. 2290-86).
426. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 344, 546 N.E.2d at 905, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
See generally Kalven, Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative v. Contributory Negligence:
Should the Court or Legislature Decide? 21 VAND. L. REv. 889, 901 (the best parties can do is divide
loss equally).
427. See supra notes 362, 398-426 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revision re-
quiring buyers to prove causation and adopting a comparative negligence scheme to allocate
damages.
428. The comment to revised section 4-406 contains no justification for the change. See Five
Towns College v. Citibank, 108 A.D.2d 420, 429-30, 489 N.Y.S.2d 338, 345 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
(UCC's balance of rights in article 4 is attempt to be fair and equitable).
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tions to prevent and detect forgeries, and whether customers will find it finan-
cially feasible to enforce their rights.4 29 In addition, this justification loses much
of its force when the customer's checks are truncated and when the customer is
an individual consumer.
1. Truncation
The drafters of the revised Code specifically have placed truncated checks
within the governance of section 4-406. The bank has the choice of either re-
turning the checks to the customer or withholding the checks, but if it withholds
the checks, it must provide a statement with information that is "sufficient to
allow the customer to identify the items paid."'4 30 Revised section 4-406 then
sets out the items of information that are deemed to be sufficient; these include
the check number, the amount of the check, and the date when the check was
paid. As the comment explains, these items were chosen because computers can
retrieve such information automatically; no human review is required. The
comment acknowledges that the revised Code does not require two other items
that would greatly facilitate the customer's ability to determine if there is a prob-
lem: the name of the payee and the date written on the check. The drafters do
not require banks to disclose this information on the statement because such
inclusion would require check examination by humans, thereby greatly increas-
ing the cost of truncation. The comment explains: "These costs will inhibit the
growth of truncation plans."
'431
If the bank chooses to truncate, it must either retain the original checks or
"maintain the capacity to furnish legible copies" of the checks for seven
years.4 32 In other words, if someone other than the customer's bank is storing
the check or copies of it, the customer's bank must be able to obtain a copy. If
the customer wants a copy, he or she can request it from the customer's bank,
which is required to provide it in a "reasonable time."' 433 If the bank that trun-
cates the checks provides a statement containing sufficient information, the cus-
tomer must promptly examine the statement and report unauthorized payments
if "the customer should reasonably have discovered" that payment based on the
statement or based on the items provided pursuant to the customer's request.434
The revised Code provides needed clarification by authorizing truncation
429. See supra notes 101-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of
Cooter and Rubin's principles as casting doubt on the proposition that it is appropriate to make it
more difficult for the customer to shift the loss to the bank.
430. Revision Draft - article 4, supra note 1, at § 4-406(1). The comment states that the
method the bank chooses "is a matter for bank-customer agreement." Id. comment 1. If the written
contract between the parties is silent on this issue, perhaps the customer who receives a statement
but no checks and does not object is considered to have agreed to truncation. Given the novelty of
truncation, the better course may be to require banks wishing to truncate to enter into a written
contract with the customer in which the customer explicitly agrees to truncation, and the customer's
duties are set out and fees for copies disclosed.
431. Id. § 4-406 comment 1.
432. Id. § 4-406(2).
433. Id.
434. Id. § 4-406(3).
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and by stating precisely what information a statement must contain to meet min-
imal standards of section 4-406. The revision enables banks to automate their
operation to a considerable extent, which should benefit them and their custom-
ers; truncation is more efficient and should lead to lower costs for those custom-
ers choosing this option.43 5
It is less clear, however, whether banks that truncate checks should gain
the advantages the revised Code provides. The current loss allocation scheme is
justified in part by the assumption that the customer is the one who can prevent
the loss at the lowest cost. Truncation, however, makes it far more costly for the
customer to discover forgeries,436 and the revised Code exacerbates the difficulty
of spotting forgeries by permitting the bank to issue a statement that omits infor-
mation the customer needs, especially the name of the payee. This added ex-
pense substantially undermines the justification that the customer is the party
who can prevent loss at the least cost.4 3 7
To gain a true perspective of the revised Code's allocation of loss in a trun-
cated environment, one must add the increased costs of forgery detection to the
customer under truncation to the increased burdens the revised Code imposes on
all check customers trying to shift the loss to the bank.438 In addition, factors
other than which party can take precautions at the least cost also should be
considered. 4 39 When all of these elements are taken into account, it is reason-
435. See id. § 4-406 comments (assumption is that banks will differentiate charges on basis of
whether customer wishes return of checks).
436. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, at 697-98. To detect forgeries, a customer must
carefully reconcile the balance shown on the statement with the balance shown by his or her calcula-
tions in the customer's checkbook, taking into account all deposits and withdrawals, preauthorized
payments of recurring bills, fees for services such as stop payment, and use of ATM's monthly
service charges, etc. The checks listed on the statement should be individually compared with the
record on the check stub and the carbonless copies of the checks, which banks often provide. Even if
a discrepancy is found, the customer still does not know if it was caused by a forgery unless he or she
takes several steps. First, the customer should request a copy of the checks that the customer be-
lieves may be questionable. The bank likely will impose a charge for each check requested. To be
certain not to miss anything, the customer would be well advised to request all checks received by
the bank, or whoever is retaining them, during the period covered by the statement. See Appellants'
Brief at 8, McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (No.
05-88-00652-CV) (claims customer cost would run $55 to $80 monthly to obtain copies of cancelled
checks during period checks were forged). Second, the customer should pray that the bank will send
originals or legible copies. Once the documents are received, the customer must examine the checks
for forgeries, and report any forgeries to the bank. Finally, the customer must be prepared to argue
that, if UCC § 4-406 applies, the court also should take all of the above steps into consideration in
construing the prompt reporting requirement. The court should not find the customer took too long
to notify the bank of forgeries even though many weeks or months have elapsed between receipt of
the statement and the reporting of forgeries in a truncated environment.
437. If low cost, high speed signature verification equipment becomes available, this difference
will be reduced further, if not eliminated.
438. See supra notes 359-72, 398-426 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revised
Code requiring the customer to prove the bank's negligence substantially contributed to the loss and
a discussion of the comparative negligence standard making it more difficult for customers to resolve
disputes satisfactorily.
439. See supra notes 102-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether consideration
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able to question whether the revised Code has struck the correct balance when
checks are truncated.
2. Individual Consumers
Finally, concerns about the appropriateness of the balance struck by the
revised Code arise when the customers are individual consumers. The UCC
approach starkly contrasts with modern federal consumer banking law. For ex-
ample, federal law has established elaborate error resolution procedures to en-
sure that consumers have necessary safeguards when an unauthorized electronic
fund transfer payment occurs. 44 Federal lawmakers recognize that when a stat-
ute is enacted, consumers rarely know their rights and responsibilities under the
new law. Therefore, unlike the revised UCC, which assumes customers can dis-
cover the contents of the new law on their own, federal law requires banks to
notify consumers of what the law provides."'
The drafters of the revised Code decided not to adopt any special provisions
to protect the individual consumer. That course of action has been left to the
discretion of federal and state legislators. In light of the increased burdens that
the revised Code places on customers, further action by lawmakers may be war-
ranted. 442 In the absence of consumer legislation, the revised Code should en-
sure that consumers know the new ground rules and are not under the erroneous
impression that check transaction disputes are covered by a protective procedure
comparable to that which governs other types of payment systems. The revised
Code should require banks to notify consumers of their responsibility to report
forgeries promptly. The notice should describe the new requirements the revised
Code imposes upon them if they seek to shift the loss for a forged check to the
bank. In addition, individual consumers using truncation services may benefit
from a notice that both explains the additional steps truncation requires a con-
sumer to take to identify forgeries and discloses the cost of obtaining copies of
their checks.
V. A BETTER APPROACH
A. Possible Approaches
Many approaches to bank responsibilities for check forgery are possible. At
also should be given to issues arising from the application of the principles of loss spreading, loss
reduction, and loss imposition.
440. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 205.7(a)(10) (1990) (banks shall disclose notice containing detailed
electronic funds transfer error resolution procedure and customer's rights under it); 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.11 (1990) (creditors in credit card transactions shall follow mandated billing error resolution
procedure).
441. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 205.7(a)(10) (notice required to consumers of error resolution proce-
dure that banks and consumers required to follow); 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d) (1990) (creditors in credit
card transactions required to disclose mandated billing error resolution procedure); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 229.15(b), 229.17 (1990) (notice required to consumers of when banks must have funds deposited
by check available to consumer).
442. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 101, at 90-92 (consumers should be strictly liable for
losses, but only up to fixed and low maximum in situations where both parties can take precautions).
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one extreme, the law could retire from the battlefield entirely, and allow a bank
to adopt any procedure it desires. Society could rely upon the forces of competi-
tion in a free market to provide customers both with adequate information about
bank practices and with an array of satisfactory choices. At the other extreme,
the law could impose liability on any bank that failed to establish a system in
which every check was subject to meaningful sight review. The first alternative
conflicts with the national policy, in force ever since the widespread failure of
the banking system in the Depression, to ensure by law a minimum level of
performance standards for the national payments system.443 It also is contrary
to the UCC, which requires "good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care"
generally, 4 " and "ordinary care" specifically in regard to check processing.445
The second alternative is unacceptable because it is too rigid. Many banks could
not meet the check processing deadlines set by law4" 6 and keep costs at a reason-
able level if they had to carefully examine every check. Consequently, banks
would continue bulk filing, and bear the loss for all forged signatures. Such a
result removes from customers the incentive to take reasonable precautions.
In between these two extremes are countless other options. The revised
Code adopts the bank protectionist approach. The revision is consistent with
the current Code's objective of facilitating flexibility to allow banks to develop
technology and improve the speed and efficiency of check processing. 44 7 The
revision also probably places loss on the party able to prevent loss at the least
cost, the customer. On balance, however, the revised Code's approach is objec-
tionable because it violates the loss imposition principle by making litigation by
customers excessively burdensome. It also violates the loss spreading principle
because banks can better spread the loss. The revision provides no incentives for
banks to take precautions or to promote the development of technological inno-
vations that improve forgery detection, such as static signature verification.
Further, the revision is contrary to the Code's objectives of stability and predict-
ability. Finally, the revised Code continues the confusion engendered by inject-
ing tort principles into an essentially commercial contract context.
An alternative to the revised Code approach would retain the revised
Code's provisions, but also would require the bank to send a notice containing
necessary information to every customer if it does not conduct sight review. The
notice would inform the customer that, contrary to the impression the customer
may have from signing a signature card, the bank does not examine the signa-
ture on every check. Consequently, to protect itself, the customer must take
adequate precautions or face liability if forgeries are not promptly reported and
the customer cannot prove the bank failed to exercise ordinary care and the
failure substantially contributed to the loss that occurred. This notice could
443. See W. LOVETr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs LAW 14-18 (1984) (national
policy in force since depression-era failure of bank system).
444. U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
445. Id. § 4-103(1).
446. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (depositors' prompt access to funds required); U.C.C. §§ 4-301,
4-302 (bank must act within prescribed time limit, else customer has remedies).
447. U.C.C. § 4-103 comment 1.
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easily be printed on the statement or inserted with the merchandising solicita-
tions which accompany the statement.
B. A Proposal to Improve the Revised Code
A better approach is to resolve the fundamental issue of whether banks
have a duty to know their customers' signatures despite the customers' failure to
report forgeries promptly and to modify the revised Code in a manner consistent
with that resolution. The modification proposed below removes some of the
confusion caused by the present and revised Codes. It does not dictate custom-
ers' and banks' actions completely, however. Some lack of clarity is the neces-
sary cost of providing banks the requisite flexibility to adopt new practices.
Some courts have held that the bank has a duty to know its customer's
signature even on checks it pays after the customer's reporting deadline has
passed. Courts have derived this duty from the Code and from the parties' con-
tractual relationship; this duty was the underpinning of the decisions in Med-
ford 4 4 8 and Putnam.44 9 If the bank has this duty, then the bank must adopt a
procedure that reasonably relates to the detection of forgeries to meet the ordi-
nary care standard.4 50 While the meaning of the phrase "reasonably relates" is
vague, it is clear that the practice of the bank in McDowell would not pass mus-
ter because it had no procedure at all. More problematic are the procedures of
banks that conduct sight review only of checks over a certain amount or that
combine a sight review of some checks with random review of others. Reason-
able people can disagree substantially over what might be the appropriate
amount above which the bank should conduct sight review, or the proper per-
centage of checks that should be subject to random review. The "reasonably
relates" test, however, gives banks and customers some standard for judging the
bank's procedure.
The courts deciding Wilder and Zapata appear to have believed that the
bank's duty to know its customer's signature undergoes a radical transformation
once the bank proves the customer failed to report promptly. Those opinions
concentrate on section 4-103(3)'s provision that the bank makes out a prima
facie case by showing its practice conforms to general banking usage.45 1 The
Wilder and Zapata courts assume the bank's procedure meets the requirements
of ordinary care as long as it is consistent with general banking practice. 452 The
Code and contract origins of the bank's duty to know its customer's signature
are ignored. Implicit in these decisions is the courts' assumption that the cus-
448. Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 592-95, 676 P.2d 329, 332-33
(1984).
449. Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 74 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 546
N.E.2d 904, 906, 547 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (1989). See also McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit
Union, 772 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (Code basis for duty owed).
450. Medford Irrigation Dist., 66 Or. App. at 593, 676 P.2d at 332.
451. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988);
Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 131, 552 N.E.2d 783, 787
(1990).
452. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 31, 8.02[4][c], at 8-39.
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tomer's negligence in not promptly reporting wipes out the bank's duty to know
its customer's signature.
The revised Code does not directly address whether the bank has a duty to
detect forged signatures after the customer fails to report promptly. Instead, the
revision states that sight review is not required if the failure to employ sight
review "does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's proce-
dures do not vary unreasonably from general banking usage not disapproved by
this Article [3] or Article 4.' ' 453 No guidance is provided regarding other meth-
ods of check processing except the general provision that ordinary care "means
observance of reasonable commercial standards. '45 4 One determines relevant
reasonable commercial standards by comparing the business's practices with
those which prevail "in the area" where the business is located. 455
The revised Code does not provide guidance to banks, such as the credit
union in McDowell, that employ no review procedure of any kind, or to banks
such as the one in Zapata, that have a procedure combining sight review with
random review and no review, depending upon the amount of the check. Merely
requiring the bank to observe "reasonable" commercial standards begs the ques-
tion of what should be considered reasonable. Because of such deficiencies in
the revised Code, courts will continue to face questions involving the bank's
ordinary care obligation if the revised Code is enacted in its present form.
The better course is to specify in the revised Code that the bank still has a
duty to know its customer's signature.45 6 This is consistent with the contractual
relationship between the parties that is created when the customer signs a signa-
ture card, and with the Code scheme that is premised upon the bank's duty to
pay only checks with authorized signatures. The revised Code changes the bal-
ance between the customer and the bank by substantially protecting the bank
from loss. In contrast, by proposing that the revised Code state that the bank
still has an obligation to know the customer's signature, this article essentially
recommends maintaining the balance contemplated by the present Code, under
which both parties are given incentives to take precautions. This approach is
justified by both parties' ability to take precautions; both sides should bear the
responsibility for making the payment system work. An examination of eco-
nomic principles, contract, and tort law, as well as UCC objectives, demon-
strates that each party can make a strong case for foisting liability onto the
other. Given that state of affairs, the proposed approach is essentially conserva-
tive. The present Code scheme has worked reasonably well; lacking clear evi-
dence that it has not produced results outrageously favorable to customers and
burdensome to banks, the present balance should be maintained with certain
clarifying modifications.
One consequence of the decision to impose a duty on the bank to know its
453. Revision Draft - article 3, supra note 342, at § 3-103(7).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Because state legislatures' consideration of changes to the present Code will take place
within the context of their deliberations over the revised Code, this article's proposals are presented
as modifications to the proposed revisions.
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customer's signature is the concomitant obligation on the bank to establish a
procedure reasonably related to detecting forgeries.4 57 The Code should make
clear that sending the customer a statement and cancelled checks does not con-
stitute a reasonable procedure, because it amounts to no procedure at all. 458
In determining whether a bank has established a reasonable procedure,
courts should consider the role of technological innovations. For example, if
low-cost, high-speed signature verification equipment 45 9 becomes available, a
court might decide that a bank that randomly examines one percent of all checks
under $5,000, rather than use such equipment, has failed to exercise ordinary
care. It would be expensive to require banks to install state-of-the-art signature
verification equipment every time such equipment becomes available. Instead,
the revised Code should incorporate a "reasonably relates" requirement and add
a comment stating that one factor courts should consider in assessing ordinary
care is the availability of technological improvements.
Under the proposed modification, banks would not be required to conduct
sight review of every check. Therefore, the revised Code should include the
following provision: if the bank does not conduct sight review, it must notify the
customer of that fact and inform the customer of the importance of examining
each statement and promptly reporting forgeries for the customer to protect it-
self from loss.
The revised Code's requirement that the customer prove the bank's failure
to exercise ordinary care "substantially contributed to loss" should be deleted.
Even without that requirement most customers will refrain from suing under
section 4-406 because of the substantial transaction costs of litigation and the
uncertainty of success unless the bank has no procedure to detect forgeries. Fur-
ther, including the substantial contribution requirement makes litigation even
more impracticable, since it is unclear what the customer would have to show to
satisfy the requirement." '0
Finally, the revised Code could be improved appreciably by removing from
it all comparative negligence concepts. The removal of such schemes would re-
turn the customer and the bank to about the same position they are in under the
current Code. Removing comparative negligence principles from the Code ar-
guably is objectionable since the entire loss may be imposed on a bank that
lacked ordinary care even though the customer's conduct was negligent. Any
potential gains in fairness achieved by comparative negligence, however, are out-
457. See supra notes 196-97, 239 and accompanying text for a discussion of the presumption
that the bank knows its customer's signature and has a duty to verify its authenticity and that the
bank is allowed to adopt any procedure, as long as it is reasonably related to discovering forged
signatures.
458. See Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Sav. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 134 552 N.E.2d
783, 789 (1990) (Calvo, J., dissenting) (merely sending cancelled checks not ordinary care).
459. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of innovative electronic
equipment used to detect forgeries.
460. See supra note 372 and accompanying text for a discussion of difficulties interpreting and
applying the substantial contribution requirement.
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weighed by the uncertainty and increased litigation burden such a scheme im-
poses on both parties.
The impact of the proposed modifications to the revised Code would not be
great. The new definition of ordinary care in the revised Code would be re-
tained. The definition does not mandate radically new procedures; it is merely a
less confusing statement of the standard of care requirement of the present Code.
The allocation of loss under the proposed modifications remains the same as
under the present Code. A major change under the proposed modifications,
however, is the explicit requirement that the bank adopt a procedure reasonably
related to detecting forgeries. In assessing the impact of this requirement, it is
important to keep in mind that under both the present Code and the revised
Code, the bank bears the loss on all checks it pays when the customer reports
forgeries promptly, and on the first check in a series of checks when the cus-
tomer does not report promptly."' In addition, when erroneous payments are
made due to mistakes that are not within the scope of the customer's duty to
report, the loss is on the bank.462 Banks that want to protect themselves against
these losses have already instituted procedures to detect unauthorized signatures
or have purchased insurance. In some jurisdictions the proposed modifications
would not increase the bank's liability, for some courts have already imposed the
"reasonably relates" requirement upon banks. " 3
In those jurisdictions where courts have not held that banks must have a
procedure that reasonably relates to forgery detection, banks with no procedure
in place may incur the additional cost of establishing a procedure, absorbing the
additional losses, or purchasing insurance to cover those potential losses. If the
available evidence is accurate, the added cost should not be too great. Credit
unions do not examine checks for forgeries because ordinarily the checks are
held by a third party.46 Instead, credit unions purchase insurance to protect
themselves from liability. The cost of the insurance "is minimal due to an ex-
tremely low loss ratio during the fourteen years" the credit unions have used this
system. 465 The paucity of reported cases indicates customers are filing very few
lawsuits under section 4-406(3). 'In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the
reported cases are the ones involving the most money. Yet almost all of the
reported cases during the last decade involved amounts under $100,000. The
briefs filed by the banking associations provide no data indicating that forged
signatures are a major problem for banks.46 6 Indeed, one bank concluded that
461. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b). See supra note 9 for the relevant text of the current section 4-406
and supra note 340 for the relevant text of the proposed revised section 4-406.
462. See, e.g., Faber v. Edgewater Nat'l Bank, 101 N.J. Super. 354, 244 A.2d 339 (1968)
(checks charged against wrong account). See generally J. CLARKE, H. BAILEY, R. YOUNG, BANK
DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 119 n.51 (1972).
463. McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 593, 676 P.2d 329, 332 (1984).
464. Seibold & Kessler, supra note 337, at 1097.
465. Id. at 1098.
466. Motion For Leave to File a Brief and Brief of the American Bankers Association as Ami-
cus Curiae, Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 135 Ill. 2d 121, 522 N.E.2d 783
(1990) (No. 67709); Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Illinois Bankers Association, on Behalf of Defend-
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its data showed losses from forgeries are "infinitesimal." ' "47 The modifications
proposed in this article may result in higher costs to banks because they require
courts to take into consideration technological innovations designed to identify
forged signatures. Courts should require banks to adopt new technology to meet
the ordinary care standard, however, only if it is available at a reasonable cost
and will not unduly slow check processing.
CONCLUSION
Section 4-406 of the UCC fails to adequately deal with questions relating to
the bank's duty of ordinary care when it engages in bulk filing. The case law
addressing these issues is split between decisions that focus on the bank's rela-
tionship to its customer, and those that instead compare the bank's practices to
those of other banks. The revised Code only partially remedies the defects of the
present law by improving the definition of ordinary care. It leaves many issues
unresolved and alters the balance of rights and obligations by constructing a loss
allocation scheme that will preclude most customers from seeking to enforce
their rights even when their banks engage in conduct that clearly violates their
duty to exercise ordinary care.
This article proposes modifications to the revised Code that, unlike the re-
vised Code, give substance to the contractual relationship between the bank and
the customer, provide incentives for each party to take precautions, and en-
courage banks to take advantage of technological improvements. The proposal
accomplishes these ends by establishing a two-fold test: (1) banks must exercise
ordinary care by observing reasonable commercial standards; and (2) banks have
a duty to know their customers' signatures even when the customer fails to re-
port forgeries promptly. Because of this duty, banks are required to establish a
procedure reasonably related to detecting forgeries of the customers' signatures.
One factor in determining whether a bank's procedure meets the "reasonably
related" standard is the availability of technological systems for detecting
forgeries.
Banks would have the incentive to take precautions under the proposed
system because the proposal would shift liability for all loss to the bank if the
customer met its burden of proof. At the same time, customers would have to
safeguard their checkbooks and report forgeries promptly because they would
bear the loss unless they could show the bank's conduct did not meet the Code's
standards.
While this proposal would result in more certainty than the present Code
and the revised Code, a degree of uncertainty would remain, because the scheme
fails to require that banks adopt any specific procedure. The advantage of this
uncertainty is that it gives banks needed flexibility. The disadvantage of a flexi-
ble scheme is that prior to litigation neither the bank nor the customer can know
ant-Appellant, Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank, and Illinois Banking Corporation, Wilder Binding
Co. (No. 67709).
467. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 25, Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank,
66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329 (1984) (No. 81-1914-J-1; A-26603).
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definitely whether a bank's procedure will satisfy the standard, unless the bank
has no procedure at all. Consequently, uncertainty will persist unless case law
determines which procedures meet the standards. An element of vagueness is
preferable to locking banks into rigid requirements, however. A reasonable
amount of flexibility also is an improvement over the approach taken by the
revised Code which, in effect, allows banks to adopt whatever forgery detection
procedures they want because rarely is it rational for a customer to litigate under
the revised Code.

